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Convictions Based on Lies: Defining Due
Process Protection
Anne Bowen Poulin,
Abstract
The corrupting impact of false testimony on the justice system is
profound and corrosive. The Supreme Court has long-since held that the
due process clause protects against convictions based on testimony that
the prosecutor knew or should have known was false.
Despite this precedent, courts have undermined that constitutional
protection by imposing demanding requirements of prosecution
knowledge, narrowing the definition of false testimony, and holding
defendants to an inappropriatestandardof materiality. As a result, the
law does not provide adequateprotectionfrom conviction based on lies.
Courts must reinvigorate this area of the law. To provide
appropriate protection, the requirements a defendant must meet to
receive relief based on the use offalse testimony must be clarified in the
following ways. First, the prosecution should be deemed to have
knowledge of the falsity not only if an individualprosecutor had actual
knowledge, but also if the prosecution did not meet its duty to discover
that the testimony was false or if the prosecution had knowledge of
contrary information possessed by other government actors and
therefore imputed to the prosecution. Second, the false testimony need
not rise to the level ofperjury. Third, the courts should apply the more
lenient standard of materiality defined for false testimony cases by
asking how the revelation that the witness had testifiedfalsely would
have influenced the jury in the initial trial ratherthan asking what would
have occurredhad the witness simply given truthful testimony.
In addition, the courts should revisit the law that applies when a
defendant discovers that the prosecution unknowingly presented false
testimony. If the falsity was material, the courts should conclude that the
conviction violates due process despite the lack of prosecution
1. Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. I am indebted to Kristin
Mancuso and Angela Hennesy for their excellent research assistance, to my colleague
Professor Louis Sirico for his helpful comments, and to Villanova University School of
Law for its generous support.
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knowledge. Even if the courts do not extend due process protection to
the unknowing use offalse testimony, they should grant the defendant a
new trial more readily than with other types of newly discovered
evidence. The corrupting impact offalse testimony callsfor at least this
level ofprotection.
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It is the State that tries a man, and it is the State that must insure that
the trial is fair.2
Souter was convicted of murder in 1992, based on a death in 1979.
The victim had spent the early part of the evening with Souter before
being found lying dead on the highway. Souter's conviction was based
on prosecution testimony about the bottle from which Souter had been
drinking on the evening of the victim's death. Prosecution witnesses
testified-falsely as it turned out-that the bottle had a sharp edge that
2.

Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 810 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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was capable of inflicting the fatal injury and that there was little blood at
the scene, suggesting that the victim had been killed elsewhere and her
body then moved onto the highway. The falsity of this testimony first
came to light several years after Souter's conviction. The bottle's edge
was dull and could not have caused the wound, and the back of the
victim's clothing was soaked in blood. Even though the prosecution
witnesses had given false testimony, the state courts rejected Souter's
plea for a new trial. 3
In 1994, Caramad Conley was convicted of a double-homicide on
the testimony of an informant who testified that Conley had confessed to
him. In his trial, a homicide investigator stood by while the informant
falsely denied receiving benefits for his testimony against Conley.
Conley served 18 years before a court concluded that his conviction was
based on perjured testimony and ordered him released.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The corrupting impact of false testimony on the justice system is
profound and corrosive. The law abhors perjury.' In recent years, the
justice system has seen the exonerations of defendants whose convictions
resulted from trials that were held to be error-free and whose postconviction challenges were rejected by the courts.6 Some of these
erroneous convictions rest on false testimony.
3. The hypothetical is based on Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2005). The
likely explanation for the victim's death was that she had been hit by a car. After losing
in the Michigan courts, Souter petitioned in federal court. The Sixth Circuit held that his
claim should not be barred for failure to comply with the statute of limitations, holding
that Souter had made a sufficient showing of actual innocence to toll the statute.
4. Justin Berton, Man Wrongfully Convicted of 2 Murders Freed, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Jan. 13, 2011, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/01/12/
BARQ IH868J.DTL#ixzzlAvoN8BPT.
5. See 18 U.S.C § 1621 (2006). See also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173
(1986) (holding that failure to present false testimony cannot constitute prejudice to
support an ineffective assistance claim); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 416 (1988)
(holding that there is no constitutional right to present false testimony); United States v.
LaPage, 231 F.3d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 2000) (commenting that perjury pollutes a trial).
The expression of that abhorrence has changed over time. At one time, someone who
had been convicted of perjury was incompetent to testify. See 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, A
TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: COMPRISING A GENERAL VIEW
OF THE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COMMON AND CIVIL LAW, AND A DIGEST OF THE

PENAL STATUTES 289 (5th ed. 1861). Now, that conviction may be used to impeach the
witness, but will not bar the witness from testifying.
6. Since 1989, 273 inmates have been exonerated through the use of DNA testing.
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/

(last visited Sept. 10,

2010).
7. Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and
Newly Discovered Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 657 (2005) (citing
witness perjury among reasons for conviction of innocent defendants). See also
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But what recourse is available to the criminal defendant who
discovers that false testimony was used to obtain her conviction? The
Supreme Court has long-since held that the due process clause protects
against convictions based on testimony that the prosecutor knew or
Despite this precedent, the legal
should have known was false.
standards for reviewing convictions where the prosecution presented
false testimony are not applied with clarity and consistency. Courts have
narrowed that constitutional protection in three specific ways: imposing
demanding requirements of prosecution knowledge; limiting what is
regarded as false testimony; and holding defendants to an inappropriate
standard of materiality. As a result, the law does not provide adequate
protection from conviction based on lies.
Due process protection from the use of false testimony developed
parallel to and in conjunction with the due process principles, flowing
from Brady v. Maryland,9 that require the prosecution to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the defense. But protection from false testimony
is more robust than protection from non-disclosure of exculpatory
evidence. When false testimony is given at trial the truth finding process
is fundamentally corrupted.10 All the participants in the trial-the
prosecutors, the law enforcement officers, and the witnessesunderstand that false testimony is prohibited." The presentation of false
Proof that the prosecution
testimony violates that understanding.
Staughton Lynd, Napue Nightmares: Perjured Testimony in Trials Following the 1993
Lucasville, Ohio, Prison Uprising, 36 CAP. U.L. REv. 559, 567 (2008) (arguing that
perjury is a widespread problem in criminal cases); Bennett L. Gershman, Misuse of
Scientific Evidence by Prosecutors, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 17, 23-35 (2003)
(describing prosecution use of false scientific evidence).
8. See infra Section II.
9. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that suppression of
exculpatory evidence by the prosecution violates due process when the evidence "is
material either to guilt or to punishment").
10. See Note, A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Promises of Favorable Treatment
Made to Witnesses for the Prosecution, 94 HARV. L. REv. 887, 896 (1981) (remarking
that "a jury that hears nothing is better informed than one that is actively misled"). See
also Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1076 n.12 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that "the
prosecution's knowing use of perjured testimony will be more likely to affect our
confidence in the jury's decision, and hence more likely to violate due process, than will a
failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant"). The law has long inferred that a
witness who will lie about one fact will lie about others. See Mesarosh v. United States,
352 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1956) (refusing to credit witness' testimony in defendant's trial
because of witness's false testimony in other settings). Additional concerns arise when
the prosecutor knowingly countenances false testimony. The prosecutor's willingness to
do so signals her lack of concern with the fairness of the process and, further, suggests
that she is compensating for a weak case and raises the additional concern that she may
have allowed other falsities to go uncorrected or withheld other favorable evidence. See
infra Section III.C.3.
11. See United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 180 (1977) (recognizing that perjury is
never a protected option).
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presented false testimony calls into question the value of all the
testimony given by the lying witness. If known to members of the
prosecution team, it casts doubt on the honesty of the entire case. False
testimony cases thus always present a violation of a legal duty and the
corruption of the trial process. As a result, they demand relief.
Due process protection reflects this demand. A defendant who
demonstrates the improper use of false testimony is entitled to relief if
there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony affected the
outcome. In contrast, the standard in non-disclosure cases is higher: a
defendant who establishes that the prosecution withheld favorable
evidence must show a reasonable probability that the outcome would
have been different had the evidence been disclosed. 12 Nevertheless, in
some false testimony cases, defendants fail to seek or courts fail to apply
the more protective standards, instead analyzing them as non-disclosure
cases.'" In others, courts construe that protection too narrowly or impose
barriers that insulate convictions based on lies. As a result, those courts
fail to deliver the promised due process protection, leaving defendants
vulnerable to the use of false testimony.
This Article argues that courts should reinvigorate the due process
protection to ensure that defendants like Souter and Conley, convicted on
false testimony, receive prompt relief. Section II details relevant
Supreme Court precedent, demonstrating the basis for strong protection

12. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (stating the standard for
materiality as a "reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable
probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."). See
also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.3, 1145-46 (5th ed. 2009)
(noting that the Supreme Court continues to use the materiality standard articulated in
Bagley, which was modeled after the definition of prejudice in claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel). In cases of non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence, the court must
determine how the defense could have used the exculpatory information and whether it
would have changed the course of the trial, considering how it would have affected the
defense investigation and strategy and whether it would have yielded admissible
information.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298, 301 n.2 (3d Cir. 2006) (witness's
testimony that his contribution to the federal prosecution would have no impact on his
pending state charges was inaccurate); Ventura v. Attorney General, 419 F.3d 1269, 1276
(11th Cir. 2005) (noting that state court did not treat false testimony claim as requiring a
lower standard of materiality); Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 314-15 .(4th Cir.
2003) (addressing defendant's claim as one of non-disclosure although it seems quite
likely that testimony at trial was known by members of the government team to be false
and the government made false argument in the case); Perkins v. Russo, 586 F.3d 115,
119 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that state court did not differentiate between non-disclosure
and false testimony claims). See also Stephen A. Saltzburg, Perjury and False
Testimony: Should the Difference Matter So Much?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537, 1560-63
(2000) (suggesting that in recent years the Court has largely ignored the false testimony
cases and has evaluated all claims as non-disclosure Brady violations).
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against the use of false testimony. Section III explores the ways in which
courts have enforced the three requirements for due process
relief-prosecution knowledge; false testimony; and materiality. Section
III also considers whether courts should enforce a requirement of defense
due diligence in false testimony cases. Finally, Section IV advocates that
the courts strengthen protection in cases where the government is not
charged with knowledge that the testimony is false.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

The Supreme Court has long been committed to the principle that
due process forbids the government from obtaining a conviction through
the use of false testimony. Through a long line of cases, the Court has
condemned the prosecution's use of false testimony.14 The development
of due process protection against the use of false testimony has been
intertwined with protection against non-disclosure of exculpatory
evidence. A brief review of the Court's decisions in the interrelated
strains of due process protection is essential to understanding the issues
facing the courts in false testimony cases.
Two cases form the foundation in the line of precedent relating to
both false testimony and non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence. This
line starts in 1935 with Mooney v. Holohan, a false testimony case.15 In
Mooney, the prisoner alleged that his conviction violated due process
because the "prosecuting authorities" knowingly used perjured
testimony, which was the sole basis for his conviction.16 The Court
condemned the state's corruption of the process without considering the
The other
precise requirements for such a due process claim."
14. See, e.g., White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764 (1945) (acknowledging that
obtaining conviction through knowing use of pejury violates due process); New York ex
rel. Whitman v. Wilson, 318 U.S. 688, 689 (1943) (same); Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S.
411, 413 (1942) (prosecution's complicity in obtaining a conviction through the use of
perjured testimony violates due process).
15. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
See also Peter J. Henning,
ProsecutorialMisconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 755
(1999) (tracing protection against use of perjured testimony to Mooney); Michael E.
Rusin, Comment, The Prosecutor'sDuty of Disclose: From Brady to Agurs and Beyond,
69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 197, 201 (1978) (citing Mooney as originating duty).
16. Mooney, 294 U.S. at 110.
17. The Court explained:
[Due process] is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere
notice and hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a
trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty
through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of
testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a state to procure the
conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by
intimidation.
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foundational case is a non-disclosure case: Brady v. Maryland.18 In
Brady, the Court granted the defendant a new capital sentencing hearing
because the prosecution had not disclosed favorable evidence bearing on
sentencing, thus establishing that proof of false testimony was not
essential to a due process violation.1 9 Even though Brady did not involve
false testimony, the Court characterized its holding as an extension of
Mooney.20 The Court stressed that Mooney rested on the "avoidance of
an unfair trial to the accused" and not on "punishment of society for
misdeeds of a prosecutor." 2 1
Due process protection is triggered when the defendant establishes
that the prosecution, acting with the requisite degree of knowledge,
allowed materially false testimony to stand uncorrected. Three issues
recur throughout the Court's decisions and are critical to this aspect of
due process protection. First, the Court has repeatedly addressed the
level of governmental knowledge necessary for a due process claim.
Second, the Court has clarified the falsity requirement. Third, the Court
has had to define the level of harm that the defendant must establish to
get relief, focusing on the requirement of "materiality."

Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112. The Court also rejected the argument that the actions of
prosecutors did not fall within the fourteenth amendment. Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112-13.
18. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
19. The Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to
an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id.
at 87. See Case Comment, The Prosecutor'sConstitutionalDuty to Reveal Evidence to
the Defendant, 74 YALE L. J. 136, 136-45 (1964) (tracing development of prosecution
duty and characterizing the rules as necessary to permit the defendant to receive a fair
trial).
20. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86. Three years later, in 1967, the Court decided two cases,
each of which appeared to entail intentional prosecutorial misconduct. In Giles v.
Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967), the Court granted relief because the prosecution
deliberately suppressed evidence that would have impeached the testimony of the alleged
rape victim. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1967). A plurality of the Court
concluded that the state authorities and witnesses may have "deliberately concealed" the
information from the court. Id. at 75-76. See also id at 99 (Fortas, J,, concurring)
(stating his belief "that deliberate concealment and nondisclosure by the State are not to
be distinguished in principle from misrepresentation").
In Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court condemned the prosecutor's knowing
use of false evidence. The prosecutor had used a pair of "bloodstained" shorts as
evidence, presenting expert testimony as to the blood type on the shorts, and stressing the
evidentiary importance of the "bloodstained" shorts in argument to the jury. Id at 4.
Throughout, the prosecutor knew that the shorts were stained with paint, not blood. Id. at
6.
21. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
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Defining the Knowledge Requirement

While requiring some governmental knowledge, the Court has made
it clear that the crux of the wrong is the unfairness of the proceeding, not
the wrongdoing of the prosecutor.2 2 Thus the Court has held that false
testimony or non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence violated the
defendant's due process rights even when the prosecutor did not have
actual knowledge of the falsity or the exculpatory evidence. The Court's
decisions guide the determination of how a defendant can satisfy the
governmental knowledge requirement and establish a due process claim.
In the Court's early decisions, access to relief turned on whether the
defendant could demonstrate that the prosecutor knowingly presented
false testimony.23 However, in Mesarosh v. United States,24 the Court
strongly condemned reliance on false testimony even though the
prosecution had presented it unknowingly. In Mesarosh, the Solicitor
General acknowledged that one of its key witnesses had given false
testimony in other proceedings and, in an unusual request, asked that the
case be remanded to the trial court. Instead, the Court granted the
defendants a new trial based on the fact that the witness had been "totally
discredited," concluding that the witness's false testimony in other

22. The Court explained:
The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society for misdeeds
of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Society wins not
only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system
of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.
An inscription on the walls of the Department of Justice states the proposition
candidly for the federal domain: "The United States wins its point whenever
justice is done its citizens in the courts." A prosecution that withholds evidence
on demand of an accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate
him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the
defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding
that does not comport with standards of justice, even though, as in the present
case, his action is not "the result of guile." . . .
Id. at 87-88.
23. See Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942) (granting relief to defendant who
established that prosecution knowingly presented perjured testimony and suppressed
favorable evidence); Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 419-20 (1942) (rejecting
defendant's due process claim because he failed to substantiate his allegation that the
authorities had procured the use of false testimony). In Pyle, the Court cited Mooney and
held that a state prisoner would be entitled to habeas relief if "his imprisonment resulted
from perjured testimony, knowingly used by the State authorities to obtain his conviction,
and from the deliberate suppression by those same authorities of evidence favorable to
him." 317 U.S. at 215-16. See also Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 287 (1948)
(recognizing that petitioner's charge "that the prosecution brought undue pressure to bear
on the Government's chief witness . . . to change his testimony and that this altered
testimony was knowingly used to obtain petitioner's conviction" would support a habeas
petition).
24. Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956).
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settings precluded the finding that he was truthful in the defendants'
trial. 2 5 The Court held that "[t]he dignity of the United States
Government will not permit the conviction of any person on tainted
testimony." 26 Despite this strong statement, Mesarosh has had little
27
impact.
In contrast, Giglio v. United States,2 8 is a key decision in defining
protection from false testimony. In Giglio, the Court recognized that the
government's failure to correct false testimony could violate due process
even though no one acting for the government actually knew the
testimony was false. 29 In Giglio, the defendant's accomplice testified
against him at trial and on cross-examination denied having received any
assurances from the government in exchange for his testimony. In fact,
the accomplice had been promised that he would not be prosecuted. The
prosecutor trying the case was unaware of the agreement and therefore
did not correct the false testimony.30 The Court nevertheless held that
the failure to correct the false testimony violated the defendant's rights,
strengthening due process protection with a clear rule expanding the
ways in which the defendant could satisfy the knowledge requirement.3 '
The parallel development of the law governing non-disclosure
claims also supports allowing a defendant to satisfy the knowledge
requirement without establishing actual knowledge.
Like the

25. Id at 13-14. The Court stressed its supervisory role, acknowledging a duty "to
see that the waters of justice are not polluted." Id. at 14. The Court distinguished the
situation from that in which a defendant files a motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence, because the government acknowledged their witness' perjury and
asked the court to take action. Id. at 9-10.
26. Id at 9. The same year, four justices dissented from the dismissal of a petition,
arguing that the defendant was entitled to relief because the state "now knows that the
testimony of the only witnesses against petitioner was false" and "[n]o competent
evidence remains to support the conviction." See Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 290-91
(1956).
27. Later cases have declined to ascribe much precedential weight to Mesarosh,
characterizing it as sui generis. See United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 246 (2d Cir.
1975).
28. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
29. See generally Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 1560-63 (discussing Giglio). The
Court noted in Giglio that prosecutors' offices could establish systems for sharing
information to avoid a recurrence of the situation where the prosecutor did not correct the
false testimony because he did not know of the agreement with the witness. Giglio, 405
U.S. at 154 (1972). However, in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009), the
Court rejected the argument that a prosecutor's office could be liable for the failure to
institute such a system. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 864-65 (2009).
30. 405 U.S. at 152. The prosecutor also argued in support of the witness' credibility
that he had received no promises. Id. The witness was central to the prosecution's case,
so the government's failure was clearly material. Id
31. Id. at 154-55.
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presentation of false testimony, non-disclosure can violate due process
even though the prosecutor was unaware of exculpatory evidence.32
However, in United States v. Agurs,3 3 the Court used language that
has spawned some confusion. Agurs was a non-disclosure case,
involving no allegation of false testimony, but the Court addressed the
materiality requirement for both non-disclosure and false testimony
cases. 34 In dictum, the Court inaccurately summarized the precedent
governing false testimony, categorizing the Mooney line of cases as
involving perjured testimony of which the prosecution "knew, or should
have known" and compounded the confusion by referring to "the
knowing use of perjured testimony." 35 This characterization disregards
Giglio and suggests that a defendant must demonstrate a high level of
government knowledge.36 This inaccurate dictum appears to have
influenced future courts to construe due process protection narrowly. 37
Instead, the precedent should be read to reduce this barrier to relief.
B.

Clarifying the FalsityRequirement

The Court has also signaled that the falsity requirement is not as
demanding as some lower court decisions suggest, recognizing that any
false or misleading testimony may corrupt the truth-finding process and
render the trial unfair. 3 8 The Court has made it clear that a defendant
need not establish perjury to prevail in a false testimony case. 39
Moreover, even the use of testimony that is merely misleading may
violate due process.
In Alcorta v. Texas,40 the Court recognized that the prosecution's
failure to correct misleading testimony violated the defendant's right to
due process. The Court recognized that the prosecutor had knowingly
fostered a false impression in his examination of a key prosecution

32. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995) (granting defendant relief
on the basis of non-disclosure even though the prosecutor did not have all the exculpatory
information until after trial); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 671 n.4 (1985).
33. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
34. See infra section II.C (discussing materiality requirement).
35. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103-04. See also Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 1566-68
(discussing and criticizing Agurs).
36. Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 1567-69.
37. Id. at 1570.
38. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 265 (1959) (granting relief based on
the prosecution's failure to correct false testimony, which was relevant only to impeach
the witness' credibility); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957) (granting relief based
on the prosecution's failure to correct misleading testimony, despite the fact that the
testimony was not clearly false).
39. See Alcorta, 355 U.S. 28.
40. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
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witness. 4 1 The Court granted relief because the witness conveyed a false
impression, despite the fact that the testimony was not clearly false.42
The misleading testimony strengthened the prosecution case, and more
truthful testimony would have corroborated the defendant's claim of
sudden passion and also impeached the witness's credibility .4
In Napue v. Illinois,44 the Court also applied an inclusive definition
of falsity. In Napue, the Court granted relief based on false testimony
relevant only to impeach the witness.45 Although the prosecutor trying
the case had promised the accomplice he would seek to get his sentence
reduced,46 the accomplice falsely denied that he had received any
promise, and the prosecutor did not correct the false testimony.4 7 Even
though the falsity testimony related only to the witness's credibility, the
Court held that the defendant's right to due process was violated.48
However, in Agurs,4 9 the Court used inaccurate language to describe
the falsity requirement, appearing to endorse a narrow construction.
When the Court summarized the precedent governing false testimony, it
inaccurately described the Mooney line of cases as involving "perjured"
rather than merely false or misleading testimony.50 This limited
41. Id. at 31.
42. The witness misrepresented his relationship with the defendant's wife as merely
that of a friend, countering defendant's claim that he killed his wife in sudden passion
when he found her kissing the witness. The witness later recanted and acknowledged that
he had been conducting an affair with the wife. The prosecutor confirmed that when he
was trying the case he knew of the witness's intimate relationship with the defendant's
wife and instructed the witness not to disclose it unless asked directly. Id. at 30-31. See
generally Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 1556-57 (discussing Alcorta); Rusin, supra note
15, at 204-05 (citing Alcorta as expanding on the holding in Mooney).
43. Alcorta, 355 U.S. at 31-32.
44. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). See Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 1558-59
(discussing Napue); Rusin, supra note 15, at 204-05 (citing Napue as the most expansive
holding derived from Mooney).
45. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-70.
46. The case arose from the testimony of the defendant's alleged accomplice, who
had been sentenced to 199 years for the crime in which they both allegedly participated
and who was now cooperating with the government.
47. Napue, 360 U.S. at 265.
48. The Court quoted the New York Court of Appeals:
It is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the witness' credibility
rather than directly upon defendant's guilt. A lie is a lie, no matter what its
subject, and, if it is in any way relevant to the case, the district attorney has the
responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the
truth. * * * That the district attorney's silence was not the result of guile or a
desire to prejudice matters little, for its impact was the same, preventing, as it
did, a trial that could in any real sense be termed fair.
Id. at 269-70 (quoting People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 557 (1956)).
49. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
50. Id. at 103-04 (stating that it "has consistently held that a conviction obtained by
the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if
there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the
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characterization of the falsity requirement is not supported the cases
preceding Agurs.5 Although this aspect of the Court's opinion is
dictum, it appears to have infected the development of the jurisprudence
going forward, leading to a heightened requirement. 5 2 Instead, the
decisions that preceded Agurs should govern.
C. Adapting the Materiality Requirement
In both the false testimony and the non-disclosure cases, one critical
question is the strength of the false testimony or the undisclosed
exculpatory evidence. The Court has used "material" as a term of art to
express the required showing of strength and has varied the definition of
In this
material depending on the nature of the defendant's claim.
regard, the Court has held that false testimony claims are subject to a
lower materiality showing than non-disclosure claims.54
The Court introduced the term "materiality" into this line of cases in
Brady, stating that suppression of exculpatory evidence by the
prosecution "violates due process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment."55 In Brady, the Court did not appear to attach a
56
special meaning to the term "material" as used in this context. Only in
later cases did materiality become a central focus in the jurisprudence of
false testimony and non-disclosure.5 7

judgment

of the jury"). See also Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 1566-68 (discussing and
criticizing Agurs).
51. Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 1567-69.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (echoing the
inaccurate language of Agurs and referring to this line of cases as involving the "knowing
use of perjured testimony"); Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 1570 et seq.
53. See Bagley, 473 U.S. 667.
54. See id
55. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
56. The term is customarily used simply to express an aspect of the requirement that
the evidence bear on the issues in the case. MCCORMICK, EvIDENCE § 185 (6th ed. 2006).
57. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 298 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("Brady itself did not explain what it meant by "material" (perhaps
assuming the term would be given its usual meaning in the law of evidence),") (citing
Marshall, J., dissenting in Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 703 n.5). Justice Marshall argued that
"material" should be read merely to mean germane or relevant. 473 U.S. 703 n.5
(Marshall, J., dissenting). In decisions predating Brady. the Court had addressed the
importance of the false testimony to the case, but had not attached the analysis to the
"materiality" of the evidence. See, e.g., Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 34 (1957)
(describing the perjured testimony as "seriously prejudicial to petitioner," and noting that
without the false testimony, he "might well" have been convicted of "murder without
malice"). See also Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 290-301 (1956) (the dissenting justices
emphasized that they viewed the conviction as a violation of due process because,
without the false testimony, "no competent evidence remains to support the conviction").
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As the Court refined its definition of materiality, it differentiated
between false testimony and non-disclosure cases.58 To support a nondisclosure claim, a defendant must establish a reasonable probability that
the result would have been different had the exculpatory evidence been
disclosed.s9 In contrast, a defendant who demonstrates that false
testimony was improperly used at trial is required only to show a
reasonable likelihood that the falsity had an impact on the outcome. 60
The Court further underscored this difference by equating the reasonable
likelihood standard with the harmless error test.6 1
In Agurs, the Court advanced three reasons for applying a less
demanding materiality standard in false testimony cases. The Court
noted first that obtaining a conviction by the knowing use of perjury is
fundamentally unfair. Second, the Court stated that false testimony cases
involve prosecutorial misconduct, a proposition true of some but not all
of the prior cases. Third, the Court asserted that "more importantly ...

58. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679-80; Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103-04. In Agurs, the Court
discussed three situations that raise Brady issues: false testimony cases and two types of
non-disclosure, defined by the specificity of the defense request for information and
subject to different materiality standards. 427 U.S. at 106-07. See also Saltzburg, supra
note 13, at 1566-68. In Bagley, the Court again addressed the different standards of
materiality. Although the defendant complained that the prosecution had not disclosed
the deal between two key witnesses and the law enforcement agency that conducted the
investigation of the defendant, the defendant did not prove that the witnesses testified
falsely at trial, and the case was analyzed as a non-disclosure. The Court discussed
comprehensively the framework for analyzing non-disclosure and false testimony claims
and again emphasized that the "reasonable likelihood" standard that applies in false
testimony cases is more favorable to the defendant than the standard of materiality in
non-disclosure cases, equating it to the harmless error standard. 473 U.S. at 679-80. See
also Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 1570-73.
59. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (1985). This requirement is identical to the prejudice
requirement enforced in cases where the defendant establishes that counsel was
incompetent. It represents a substantial barrier to relief. See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S.
786 (1972). The Court examined and rejected the defendant's non-disclosure claim
because it concluded that the undisclosed exculpatory evidence of misidentification was
not material. See Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 1562-63 (discussing Moore). Given what
we now know about eyewitness identification, this case feels unsettling. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Wise, Clifford S. Fishman & Martin A. Safer, How to Analyze the Accuracy
of Eyewitness Testimony in a Criminal Case, 42 CONN. L. REV. 435, 455-64 (discussing
studies concluding that eyewitness error contributes to at least half of all wrongful felony
convictions, and discussing common causes of such error).
60. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679 n.9. The Court traced the rule to Mooney, Napue, and
Giglio.
61. In Bagley, the Court explained:
Although this rule is stated in terms that treat the knowing use of perjured
testimony as error subject to harmless-error review, it may as easily be stated as
a materiality standard under which the fact that testimony is perjured is
considered material unless failure to disclose it would be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id at 679-80.
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they involve a corruption of the truth-finding process."6 2 For these
reasons, the Court committed itself to applying the lower standard when
the defendant shows improper use of false testimony.
Despite this favorable standard, defendants in three more recent
cases failed to raise false testimony claims before the Supreme Court,
despite strong indications that each case involved false testimony.
Instead, each case came to the Court as a non-disclosure case. As a
result, the decisions clarify the law concerning the obligation to disclose
exculpatory evidence but do not directly consider the due process
implications of false testimony. In two of the cases, Kyles v. Whitley63
and Banks v. Dretke,64 the defendant nevertheless won relief on the basis
of non-disclosure, meeting the more demanding materiality standard.65
The other decision, Strickler v. Greene,6 6 demonstrates the
significance of the difference in the materiality standards. In Strickler,
the evidence suggested that a key witness had testified falsely.67 The
police had interviewed the eyewitness to the victim's abduction several
62. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103-04. The Court also stated that the standard "must reflect
our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt."
63. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). The same year, the Court denied
certiorari over dissent and permitted the prisoner to be executed despite his claim that the
State had conceded that the confession on which his sentence rested was false. The
defendant did not allege that the prosecutors were aware of the falsity at his trial. Jacobs
v. Scott, 513 U.S. 1067 (1995).
64. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 695-97 (2004).
65. In Kyles, the defendant did not argue that the prosecution had allowed perjury to
go uncorrected until after the development of the claim that the Supreme Court reviewed.
514 U.S. at 432 n.6. Although the issue was not ripe for review by the Court, Kyles
raised a question of false testimony based on the post-conviction statement of one of the
four identification witnesses who testified at trial. After the trial, the witness
acknowledged that during the investigation she had told the police that she had not seen
the perpetrator well enough to identify him. She explained that she identified Kyles at
trial only after being pressured by members of the prosecution team and assured that all
the other witnesses identified him.
In Kyles, the Court clarified four aspects of materiality: 1) the defendant does not
have the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the suppressed
evidence would have produced an acquittal; 2) the test is not sufficiency of the evidence;
3) once the court finds constitutional error (withholding of material information) there is
no harmless error review; and 4) the evidence withheld must be considered cumulatively.
514 U.S. at 434-37.
In Banks, the government suppressed evidence that its key witness was a paid
confidential informant and allowed the witness's false testimony about the nature of his
relationship with the police to stand uncorrected at trial. The defendant failed to raise the
false testimony claim. 540 U.S. at 690 n. 11. See also Brief for Petitioner, Banks (No.
02-8286), 2003 WL 22437577. Despite this failure, the defendant prevailed under the
more demanding materiality test applied to the suppression of favorable evidence. Banks,
540 U.S. 668, 698-99.
See Saltzburg, supra note 13
66. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
(discussing Strickler at length).
67. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 273-74.
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times, and her statements to the police would have contradicted her
testimony at trial that she had an excellent, clear memory of the
defendants as well as their victim and was struck by the events at the
time she witnessed them. 6 8 Nevertheless, the defendant cast the case as a
non-disclosure case rather than a false testimony case. 69 Holding the
defendant to the higher standard of materiality, the Court rejected the
defendant's due process claim. While the Court believed the suppressed
information raised a reasonable possibility of a different result at verdict
or sentence, the Court did not agree that it raised a reasonable
probability. 7 0 Thus, in this instance, the defendant's failure to seek the
more favorable standard by pursuing a false testimony claim rather than
merely arguing on the basis of non-disclosure was fatal to the
defendant's case.
Both courts and defendants should embrace the greater protection
available in false testimony cases. The Court has consistently recognized
the corrupting impact of false testimony, establishing protective rules. A
defendant is entitled to relief if the prosecutor allowed to stand incorrect
testimony that the prosecutor knew or should have known was false or
misleading.71 The testimony need not constitute perjury, and the
prosecutor need not have had actual knowledge that the testimony was
false or misleading.72 The defendant need only show a reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony had an impact on the outcome. The
Court has never abandoned or specifically narrowed its holdings in this
line of cases. 74 Continued enforcement of this protection, based on the
special concerns that arise in false testimony cases, is critical: the
protection should not be either overlooked or diluted.

68. The prosecutor's open file policy taken with the fact that the documents that
impeached the witness were not provided to the prosecutor misled defense counsel.
69. See Brief for Petitioner, Strickler (No. 98-5864), 1998 WL 880835. See also
Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 1545-50 (demonstrating the evidence established that witness
had testified falsely and raising the question of why case was not evaluated as a false
testimony case).
70. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289-90. The Court stressed that the question was not
whether the defendant would have received a different verdict, but whether the trial was
fair. Id. at 291. Justice Souter, in an opinion joined by Justice Kennedy, argued that,
although defendant had not met the burden for his conviction, he had met the burden as to
his capital sentence. 527 U.S. at 297 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("I believe there is a reasonable probability ...

that disclosure .

.

. would have led the

jury to recommend life, not death, and I respectfully dissent.").
71. See supra Section II.A (discussing the knowledge requirement).
72. See supra Section IL.B (discussing the falsity requirement).
73. See supra Section II.C (discussing the reasonable likelihood standard).
74. See Saltzburg, supra note 13.
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ESTABLISHING A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS

To establish a due process violation based on false testimony, the
defendant must clear the three hurdles discussed above. The defendant
must show that false testimony was presented at trial, that the
prosecution had the requisite culpability through actual, constructive, or
imputed knowledge, and that the false testimony was significant enough
to be deemed material. In addition, if the defendant knew or should have
known the testimony was false, the defendant may need to persuade the
court that the defendant did not fail to meet the defense obligation of due
diligence.7 ' Each of these hurdles is sometimes construed to become an
insurmountable barrier to defense relief.
The courts should instead interpret each of these requirements in a
manner that reflects the concerns underlying the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence, reducing the barriers standing between the defendant and
relief from a conviction based on false testimony. Subsection A argues
that the knowledge requirement should be satisfied not only by proof of
actual knowledge but also when the prosecutor would have discovered
the falsity with the exercise of due diligence or when the knowledge of
other government actors is imputed to the prosecutor. Subsection B
argues that protection from false testimony is not limited to instances of
perjury, but should apply equally to misleading, but not technically false
testimony, and even to testimony that the witness believes is true, but is
actually false. Subsection C contends that the courts sometimes impose
too high a standard of materiality and discusses both the applicable
standard and the way in which courts should evaluate whether a
defendant has met that standard. Subsection D argues that courts should
not enforce a requirement of defense due diligence in false testimony
cases, recognizing that even if the defendant knows or could discover
that the testimony is false, the defendant cannot defend against
prosecution-endorsed falsity.
A.

The Knowledge Requirement

A key question in determining the extent of due process protection
is the requisite governmental knowledge the defense must establish to
prove a violation based on false testimony. Prosecutors have a duty to
pursue justice, and courts often emphasize the prosecutor's obligation
75. See Shih Wei Su v. Filion, 335 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the
defense met their burden of due diligence for purposes of a false testimony claim).
76. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004) (citing cases); United States v.
LaPage, 231 F.3d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing prosecutors' duty to see that
justice is done); Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor'sDuty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 309, 314-15 (2001) (discussing basis for prosecutor's special duty).
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to see that justice is done.77 However, throughout the development of
due process jurisprudence relating to non-disclosure of exculpatory
evidence or false testimony, the Court has emphasized that the
prosecution's good or bad faith is not the issue; the defendant need not
show misconduct by an individual prosecutor.78 The crux of the

77. The most quoted statement of the prosecutor's special duty is found in Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935):
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
See also Drake v. Portuondo, 553 F.3d 230, 240 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that "a conviction
obtained through testimony the prosecutor knows to be false is repugnant to the
Constitution . . . because, in order to reduce the danger of false convictions, we rely on
the prosecutor not to be simply a party in litigation whose sole object is the conviction of
the defendant before him," and further stating that "[t]he prosecutor is an officer of the
court whose duty is to present a forceful and truthful case to the jury, not to win at any
cost"); Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (noting that "[t]he
Supreme Court has long emphasized 'the special role played by the American prosecutor
in the search for truth in criminal trials' (quoting Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263, 281
(1999)) and that "a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such
by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment"); see also
Ronald L. Carlson, False or Suppressed Evidence: Why a Need for the Prosecutorial
Tie?, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1171, 1172 (1969) (noting emphasis on prosecutor's duty to do
justice).
78. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) ("[i]f the suppression of
evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not
the character of the prosecutor"); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (for
Brady purposes it does not matter "whether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence
or design"); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (noting that suppression of
material exculpatory evidence violates due process "irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution"); Smith v. Sec'y of New Mexico Dept. of Corr., 50 F.3d 801,
823 (10th Cir. 1995) (emphasizing that Brady protection rests on fairness of trial, not
wrongdoing of prosecutor). See also Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1365, 1405-06 (1987)
(acknowledging the Court's assertion that the prosecutor's wrongdoing is not the issue
but arguing that the Court has nevertheless varied test depending on degree of
prosecutor's fault); Bennett L. Gershman, Mental Culpability and Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 121, 124-26 (1998) (explaining that prosecutorial
misconduct is not generally treated as relevant to finding of trial error but arguing that the
prosecutor's intent should always be relevant). But see United States v. Damblu, 134
F.3d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1998) (characterizing false testimony cases as designed to
discourage prosecutorial misconduct).
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violation when false testimony stands uncorrected is not prosecutorial
wrong-doing or negligence, but rather the corrupting effect on the trial.79
Nevertheless, the defendant is required to show at least some level
of prosecution responsibility for the information.80 When a prosecution
witness testifies falsely at trial, the government knowledge may fall in
one of four possible categories: 1) the prosecution knew the evidence
was false and allowed it to stand; 2) the prosecutor did not know the
testimony was false, but would have discovered the falsity had the
prosecutor exercised due diligence; 3) the prosecutor did not know the
testimony was false, but other government actors whose knowledge can
be imputed to the prosecutor had information that demonstrated the
falsity; and 4) no one on the prosecution team or whose knowledge can
be imputed to that team knew or should have known the testimony was
false. If the court treats the case as falling in this last category, the
defendant must satisfy a more demanding standard to win relief.8 '
In some cases, the defendant can establish that the prosecutor
handling the case actually knew the witness's testimony was false. More
often, however, the prosecutor unwittingly presents false testimony.82
Questions remain concerning how the defendant can fulfill her burden if
she cannot establish actual knowledge.83 While actual knowledge is
sufficient, it is not necessary to establish a violation. 84 The defendant
may succeed by arguing either that the prosecution had a duty to discover
the falsity or that knowledge should be imputed or attributed to the
prosecution. The most common phrasing of the prevailing test, drawn
from Supreme Court precedents, uses duty language: the defendant must
show that the prosecutor knew or should have known of the falsity.8' In
79. See Mark D. Villaverde, Note, Structuring the Prosecutor'sDuty to Search the
Intelligence Community for Brady Material, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1471, 1481-84 (2003)
(discussing rational for Brady obligation).
80. See Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship
Toward the Search for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 140 (Carol
Steiker ed., 2006) (stating that Brady "requires some prosecutorialmisconduct").
81. See infra Section IV.
82. See Bibas et al., New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations:
Report of the Working Group on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZo L. REV. 1961, 1984-85
(2010) (suggesting that prosecutions violations of discovery rules often result from
negligence, inadvertence, tunnel-vision, and overwork as well as poor practices).
83. Drake v. Portuondo, 553 F.3d 230, 345 (2d Cir. 2009) (declining to clarify the
knowledge requirement).
84. See Mooney v. Trombley, No. 05-CV-71329-DT, 2007 WL 2331881, at *14
(E.D. Mich. 2007 Aug. 13, 2007) (stating that in order to obtain post-conviction relief,
the defendant must allege that the prosecution knew or should have known about the
perjured statement).
85. See id. at *2, *14 (rejecting post-conviction challenge based on claim of perjury
because defendant did not allege that the prosecutor knew or should have known of the
perjury), see also Reiss, supra note 78, at 1434 (discussing difficulty of proving
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some cases, however, the Court mixes duty language and attribution
language when discussing the knowledge requirement.86 Likewise,
others discussing due process violations do not always differentiate
among the possible legal avenues for ascribing knowledge to the
prosecution.Y The way that the requirement is defined may be critical to
the defendant's success. If the prosecution is able to defeat the
defendant's argument that false testimony violated due process simply by
insulating itself from knowledge of information pertinent to the case, the
constitutional protection of the right to a fair trial is compromised. 8
Subsection I addresses the challenges defendants face when
attempting to establish actual knowledge. Subsections 2 and 3 discuss
how the courts should construe the test to be applied when the defendant
cannot establish actual knowledge on the part of a specific prosecutor.
Subsection 2 addresses the "should have known" requirement, which
allows the defendant to satisfy the knowledge requirement by
demonstrating that the prosecution would have unearthed the falsity
through the exercise of due diligence. Subsection 3 argues that courts
should construe broadly the circumstances in which knowledge is
imputed to the prosecution. Thus, in false testimony cases, the defendant
may satisfy the knowledge requirement by three different avenues.
As the following discussion suggests, the non-disclosure cases
provide some guidance on this issue. However, the non-disclosure cases
describe a more limited prosecutorial obligation than is appropriate in
false testimony cases. In defining the scope of the prosecution's
disclosure obligation, the courts have been reluctant to create a broad

prosecutorial intent). But see Guzman v. State, 868 So.2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2003) (stating
that defendant must establish that prosecutor knew the testimony was false).
86. Compare United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (stating the
requirement that the prosecutor "knew, or should have known"), with Agurs, 427 U.S. at
110 (addressing non-disclosure and stating that "[i]f evidence highly probative of
innocence is in [the prosecutor's] file, he should be presumed to recognize its significance
even if he has actually overlooked it"). In Giglio, the Court stated both that "whether the
nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it is the responsibility of the
prosecutor" and that "[t]he prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman
for the Government. A promise made by one attorney must be attributed, for these
purposes, to the Government." Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
87. See, e.g., Mastracchio v. Vose, 274 F.3d 590, 600-01 (1st Cir. 2001) (using both
imputation and duty language); United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753, 761 (1st Cir.
1991) (using both duty and attribution language in assessing alleged non-disclosure
violation); Gershman, Misuse of Scientific Evidence, supra note 7, at 26 (using in a single
paragraph the language of agency ("vicariously responsible"), duty ("constitutionally
obligated under due process to ascertain"), and actual knowledge ("a prosecutor's claim
of ignorance of the misconduct often is plainly incredible")).
88. See Barry Tarlow, Column, RICO Report, Tape-Recorded Informer
Conversations, CHAMPION, June 24, 2000, at 55-58 (discussing risk to process when
prosecution can avoid knowledge of information possessed by Bureau of Prisons).
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constitutional right to discovery. 89 The prosecution's obligation to avoid
false testimony should be broader than the obligation to locate and
disclose exculpatory evidence. Whereas a non-disclosure violation may
occur in the absence of affirmative action on the part of the prosecution
team, 90 when the prosecution elects to call a witness, the courts should
recognize a heightened obligation to assure the truthfulness of the
witness's testimony.
1.

Actual Knowledge

It is clear that the knowing use of perjured testimony violates the
defendant's right to due process. 9 1 The prosecutor has both an ethical
89. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) (emphasizing that Brady
obligation does not mandate open file policy and represents only limited departure from
adversarial model). See also Villaverde, supra note 79, at 1486-87 (discussing
limitations on Brady obligation necessary to preserve adversarial system); Robert
Hochman, Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 1673, 1674 n.6 (1996) (noting that Brady has not been read to impose
such an obligation on the prosecution); Carlson, supra note 77, at 1403-04 (discussing
Court's unwillingness to create right to discovery).
90. The prosecution may be unaware that exculpatory evidence exists or that it has
value to the defense. Moreover, a prosecutor may withhold exculpatory evidence without
clearly breaching any legal duty. The standard of materiality on which determination of
whether the non-disclosure violated the defendant's rights is a post hoc determination,
difficult to apply before the trial is completed. As a result, the test does not define a duty
but instead defines the circumstances in which relief is required because the suppression
of favorable evidence rendered the defendant's trial constitutionally deficient. See Agurs,
427 U.S. at 107-08 (acknowledging that the question of disclosure arises before and
during trial as well as after trial, but that the standard of materiality, which requires a
review of the evidence in the context of the entire trial, must logically apply at all times).
A prosecutor turning to the Brady test for guidance before or during trial must predict
what would happen at trial, asking whether the exculpatory information is so significant
that its disclosure to the defense would have a probable effect on the outcome. See Kyles
v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1994) (discussing prosecutor's obligation). Thus the
prosecutor, committed to the case and convinced of the defendant's guilt, may not see the
exculpatory value of the information. See Paul Giannelli, Brady andJailhouse Snitches,
57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 593, 601-02 (2007) (discussing factors that weigh against
prosecutor disclosing Brady material); Bibas, supra note 80, at 143 (noting that
prosecutors have difficulty assessing what will be exculpatory).
The Court discussed this dynamic in Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-40, remarking that the
prosecutor necessarily must gauge when favorable evidence must be disclosed while also
recognizing that the prosecutor may not actually be aware of all the favorable
information. Agurs recognized that "the significance of an item of evidence can seldom
be predicted accurately until the entire record is complete." 427 U.S. at 108. See also
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 700-01 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's approach
permits prosecutors to withhold exculpatory evidence without violating their
constitutional obligation and citing examples).
91. See Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284, 293-94 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding violation due
to knowing use of perjured testimony); United States v. LaPage, 231 F.3d 488, 492 (9th
Cir. 2000). In LaPage, the court noted that prosecutors who know the witness has
testified falsely may "interrupt their own questioning, and work out in a bench conference
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duty 9 2 and a constitutional obligation to correct testimony that she knows
to be false.9 3 Despite these clear obligations, some prosecutors
knowingly allow false testimony to stand uncorrected. This conduct
amounts to deliberate deception and should be viewed as violating the
defendant's right to due process.94
Proving that an individual prosecutor actually knew the testimony
was false can be difficult.95 The prosecutor who tries the case may not
possess all the information bearing on the witness's truthfulness. 96
Moreover, prosecutors are not necessarily adept at assessing credibility
and may not realize that a witness is providing false testimony. 97
In some cases, the defendant has ready access to evidence that the
prosecutor had actual knowledge. For example, the prosecutor may have
heard the witness give contrary testimony under oath at an earlier
proceeding.98 In other cases, the prosecutor may have signed off on a
plea agreement that the witness now denies under oath. 99 If the evidence
with the judge and defense counsel how to inform the jury immediately that the testimony
is false." Id. at 492. See also Gershman, The Prosecutor'sDuty to Truth, supra note 76,
325-27 (2001) (discussing impropriety of prosecutor's subversion of truth).
92. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2010) (establishing a duty of
candor to the tribunal which includes the obligation to refrain from presenting false
evidence); and 3.8(d) (providing that the prosecutor in a criminal trial shall "make timely
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense . . ."); see also Saltzburg,
supranote 13, at 1577-78 (discussing ethical obligation not to present false testimony).
93. See supra Section II.A (discussing constitutional precedent).
94. See Henning, supra note 15, at 762 (arguing that "knowing use of perjured
testimony reaches a particularly egregious level of prosecutorial misconduct and should
therefore trigger an automatic reversal of a conviction upon a finding of actual
prosecutorial knowledge").
95. Carlson, supra note 77, at 1173, 1185 (commenting that proof of prosecutorial
wrongdoing may be hard to find).
96. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (finding due process
violation because someone in prosecutor's office knew of false testimony, although the
prosecutor trying the case did not have personal knowledge); Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d
1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that information establishing falsity was in hands of
law enforcement, but not known to prosecutor); United States v. Bhutani, 175 F.3d 572,
577 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that government agencies working on case had information
establishing falsity but prosecution did not).
97. See Giannelli, supra note 90, at 602-03 (discussing difficulty prosecutors
experience in assessing truthfulness); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation With Federal
Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling andEmbellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 917,
931-40 (1999) (discussing difficulty of determining whether cooperating witnesses are
truthful).
98. See, e.g., United States v. LaPage, 231 F.3d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding
that prosecutor knew testimony was false because it was inconsistent with witness's
testimony under oath at earlier trial in which same prosecutor participated).
99. See, e.g., Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding
violation where prosecutor questioning witness had made the relevant promise to the
witness); United States v. Mason, 293 F.3d 826, 829-30 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding due
process violation where prosecutor who had worked out plea agreement with witness
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that establishes the falsity is in files that the prosecutor has reviewed, the
prosecutor should be deemed to have actual knowledge even if the
defendant cannot establish subjective awareness at the time of the false
testimony.100 Further, even if the defendant cannot demonstrate actual
knowledge, the court should find knowledge if the defendant
demonstrates that the prosecutor had enough information to raise a
concern about the testimony but willfully blinded herself to the falsity."0 '
In some cases, however, the defendant cannot establish actual
knowledge. 10 2 Despite clear Supreme Court holdings to the contrary, a
number of courts have asserted that the defendant's due process rights
are violated only if the prosecution knows of the falsity.10 3 The courts
allowed witness to testify falsely that no one had promised him anything in return for
testifying).
100. In United States v. Joseph, 996 F.2d 36, 39-40 (3d Cir. 1993), the Third Circuit
construed the knowledge requirement too narrowly. Considering whether the prosecutor
knew or should have known of exculpatory evidence he had reviewed for a different case,
the court concluded that the prosecutor had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of
the favorable evidence.
101. See Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 744 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that prosecution
cannot avoid responsibility for false testimony by willfully avoiding knowledge of facts);
United States v. Vozzella, 124 F.3d 389, 392-93 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting the prosecution's
willful ignorance in support of holding that defendant was entitled to relief). See also
Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games ProsecutorsPlay, 57 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 531, 555-56 (2007) [hereinafter Gershman, Games Prosecutors Play]
(discussing prosecution willful blindness to exculpatory evidence); MODERN FEDERAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL §5.06 (LEXIS through 2011 legislation) (stating that
"[n]o one can avoid responsibility for a crime by deliberately ignoring what is obvious"
and defining willful blindness as "aware[ness] of a high probability" of the fact or
circumstance, or "consciously and deliberately avoid[ing] learning" about it).
102. See, e.g., Moon v. Head, 285 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2002) (illustrating
difficulty of establishing actual knowledge). See also Daniel E. Murray, Convictions
Obtained by PerjuredTestimony: A Comparative View, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 102, 107 (1966)
(discussing difficulty of establishing knowledge).
103. See, e.g., Smith v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 572 F.3d 1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Ford v. Hall, 546 F.3d 1326, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 2008)) (stating that defendant
must establish that "the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony or failed to correct
what he subsequently learned was false testimony. . ."); Carter v. Mitchell, 443 F.3d 517,
536 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating law as requiring proof that prosecutor deliberately allowed
misleading testimony to stand uncorrected); Kutzner v. Cockrell, 303 F.3d 333, 337 (5th
Cir. 2002) ("[D]ue process is not implicated by the prosecution's introduction or
allowance of false or perjured testimony unless the prosecution actually knows or
believes the testimony to be false or petjured"); Knox v. Johnson, 224 F.3d 470, 477 (5th
Cir. 2000) (stating that due process test requires proof that the prosecutor knew the
testimony was false); King v. Trippett, 192 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir. 1999) (violation lies
in the knowing use of perjured testimony); United States v. Michael, 17 F.3d 1383, 1385
(11th Cir. 1994) (asserting that violation is "axiomatic"); United States v. Young, 17 F.3d
1201 (9th Cir. 1994) (failing to evaluate false testimony under Giglio because prosecutor
did not personally know testimony was false, but granting relief under more demanding
materiality standard). See also United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1220-21 (11th
Cir. 1997) (holding that defendant had not shown due process violation because he had
not adequately demonstrated government knowledge of facts contradicting claimed false
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may have been led in this direction by the Court's statement of the law in
Agurs, inaccurately characterizing prior precedent as holding "that a
conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is
fundamentally unfair" and is subject to a lower standard of materiality.104
In addition to the misdirection of Agurs, some courts are pulled in
the direction of requiring actual knowledge by the belief that the due
process violation involves wrongdoing. 0 5 If the court conceptualizes the
violation as prosecutorial misconduct, the court is likely to require
wrongful intent, based on actual knowledge of the falsity.' 06 When
courts demand such proof of knowledge, they may fail to provide a
remedy to a defendant whose rights were violated at trial.10 7 Instead, as
the following two sections argue, courts should allow defendants to
satisfy the knowledge requirement by showing either that the prosecution
testimony and that although the government "treaded close to the line of willful
blindness," the defendant had not established actual or constructive knowledge); AbdusSamad v. Bell, 420 F.3d 614, 626 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that prosecution must know of
falsity); Lynd, supra note 7, at 564 (arguing that Napue requires defendant to show
testimony was actually perjured); R. Michael Cassidy, "Soft Words of Hope:" Giglio,
Accomplice Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 Nw. L. REv. 1129,
1163 (2004) (assuming that the Constitution is not violated if prosecutor does not correct
testimony denying inducements to witness made by the police but not personally known
to prosecutor). See also In re Personal Restraint of Benn, 952 P.2d 116, 151 (Wash.
1998) (discussing division of authority).
104. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103-04. Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court stated that the
violation consisted of using perjured testimony of which the prosecution "knew, or
should have known," recognizing earlier holdings finding constitutional violations in the
absence of actual knowledge. Id. at 103. See Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 1566-67
(arguing that the erroneous statement in Agurs redirected the development of the law).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Damblu, 134 F.3d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1998) (suggesting
that cases turn on prosecutorial misconduct and also stating that prosecution knowledge is
required). See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (suggesting that judges
may be disinclined to find prosecutors at fault).
106. United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1208 (1lth Cir. 2010) (requiring
knowledge to establish prosecutorial misconduct in eliciting or failing to correct false
testimony); Morales v. Woodford, 388 F.3d 1159, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004) (footnote
omitted) ("The due process requirement voids a conviction where the false evidence is
'known to be such by representatives of the State.' The essence of the due process
violation is misconduct by the government, not merely perjury by a witness" (quoting
United States v. LaPage, 231 F.3d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 2000)). See also United States v.
Wall, 389 F.3d 457, 473 (5th Cir. 2004) (concluding that defendant did not have a
constitutional claim in part because the trial court "exonerated the prosecution from any
wrongdoing" in relation to the allegedly false testimony); Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1221
(stating that the defendant had failed to prove prosecutorial misconduct and must
therefore satisfy the test for newly discovered evidence).
107. See Schaff v. Snyder, 190 F.3d 513, 530 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that "[t]he
clearly established Supreme Court precedent demands proof that the prosecution made
knowing use of perjured testimony" and denying relief). See also United States v. Seijo,
514 F.2d 1357 (2d Cir. 1975) (applying higher standard of materiality where the
government's negligence rather than overt misconduct, was responsible for the
prosecutor's lack of knowledge that testimony was false).
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had a duty to discover the falsity or that knowledge was imputed to the
prosecution.
2.

Duty to Discover

The Supreme Court's use of the words "knew or should have
known" in describing the due process protection from the prosecution's
use of false testimony suggests the prosecution's duty to discover
favorable information.' 08 As a result, courts should also ask whether the
prosecution fulfilled the duty to investigate or discover the information
that would have revealed the falsity.' 09 In some instances where the
prosecutor did not have actual or imputed knowledge of the falsity, the
court will conclude that the prosecutor should have known the critical
information and find a constitutional violation." 0

108. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 152 (1972); Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (holding that prosecutors have an express "duty to learn of any
favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case").
109. See, e.g., Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 111718 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that "prosecutor's duty to protect the criminal justice system"
required further investigation of possible perjury by prosecution witness); United States
v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1975) (concluding government was not
negligent in failing to discover information that would have revealed that key witness
gave false testimony). Brady cases often focus on the prosecution's duty to discover
favorable information. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (considering
Brady implications of information known to law enforcement agents but not to
prosecutor); Hollman v. Wilson, 158 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing duty to
search accessible files and stating that Brady violation will not be found if government
diligently searched); United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970 (3d Cir. 1991)
(concluding that prosecution's failure to conduct search to verify witness's criminal
record could support defendant's Brady claim.); United States v. Auten, 632 F.2d 478,
481 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding that prosecution could not avoid Brady obligation in
deciding not to run record check on witness because prosecution has obligation to
produce favorable evidence known or available to it); see also Carlson,supra note 77, at
1172; Hochman, supra note 89, at 1675 (characterizing Brady and its progeny as
imposing on the prosecution an obligation to search for favorable evidence). See also
United States v. Tierney, 947 F.2d 854, 860-61 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that due process is
violated if the government uses perjured testimony "knowingly, recklessly, or
negligently"); United States v. Stewart, 323 F. Supp. 2d 606, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(having rejected attribution, court further considered and rejected argument that
prosecution disregarded signals that should have prompted investigation and discovery of
the facts that contradicted the false testimony).
110. See, e.g., Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1075 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding
that prosecutor should have known testimony was false); United States v. Bass, 478 F.3d
948, 951 (8th Cir. 2007); People v. Comille, 448 N.E.2d 857, 865 (111. 1983) (suggesting
that prosecution cannot avoid responsibility by failing to inquire). See also Kyles, 514
U.S. at 437-38; United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970-71 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding
that prosecutor has obligation to find favorable evidence that is readily available, which
includes a duty to search accessible files). See generally Villaverde, supra note 79, at
1493-1512 (discussing approaches used by circuit courts in non-disclosure cases).
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In Giglio v. United States,' the Court held that the government
violated the defendant's right to due process by failing to correct false
testimony even though the prosecutor trying the case was unaware that
the testimony was false. In holding that the false testimony violated the
defendant's right to due process, the Court used the language of duty and
breach, as well as the language of attribution discussed below. The
Court stated that the failure to correct the false testimony was the
prosecutor's responsibility whether it was a result of "negligence or
design.""12 This aspect of Giglio signals that a court should determine
whether the prosecutor who allows false testimony to stand should have
taken steps to learn the information that demonstrated the falsity of the
testimony.
In challenges based on non-disclosure of favorable evidence, the
Court has also recognized that the prosecution's obligation extends to
exculpatory evidence in the hands of others." 3 In Kyles v. Whitley,114 the
Court stated that "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any
favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's
behalf in the case, including the police" and held that the failure to
disclose evidence known only to police investigators violated the
defendant's right to due process.' 15 This duty should also extend to
discovery of evidence that demonstrates the falsity of testimony at trial.
111.

405 U.S. 150 (1972). See Villaverde, supra note 79, at 1489 (discussing Giglio).
112. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 155.
113. See, e.g., Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (finding Brady violation where prosecution did
not disclose information in hands of police); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57-58
(1987) (treating information in files of state agency as subject to Brady obligation). See
also Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 299 (4th Cir. 2003) (using duty language to
describe prosecution's obligation under Brady); Crivens v. Roth, 172 F.3d 991, 997-98
(7th Cir. 1999) (concluding state was responsible for witness's convictions under an alias
because the information was held by a state agency); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463,
479-80 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing prosecution's "unique position to obtain information
known to other agents of the government" and corresponding duty to learn of exculpatory
evidence and holding that prosecution had duty to review witness's prison file to learn of
exculpatory impeachment evidence); United States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901, 904-05 (9th
Cir. 1996) (discussing duty). See generally Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor'sEthical
Duty to Seek Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons from England, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1379, 1380-1384 (1999) (discussing Brady obligation); Hochman,
supra note 89 (discussing prosecution's obligation to search for information); Stephen P.
Jones, Note, The Prosecutor'sConstitutionalDuty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 25
U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 735, 756-61 (1995) (discussing whether information is deemed to be
in the prosecutor's possession for purposes of Brady analysis). But see United States v.
Moore, 25 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that prosecutor does not have obligation
to seek out favorable information not within his possession). One commentator has
highlighted the fact that the Seventh Circuit developed a line of cases standing for this
interpretation of Brady with no support. See Villaverde, supra note 79, at 1510-12.
114. 514 U.S. at 437 (1995).
115. See id. at 437-38. See also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (relying on
Kyles and applying Brady analysis to exculpatory evidence obtained by the detective and
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The prosecutor's duty extends at least to the exercise of due
diligence regarding information in the hands of the law enforcement
officers working on the case. In Jackson v. Brown,"l6 for example, the
prosecutor failed to correct the witness's false denials that he had been
promised favorable treatment. The prosecutor did not have actual
knowledge of the promises made by the law enforcement officers." 7
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the prosecutor would have
discovered the promises if he had fulfilled his duty to investigate.' As a
result, the use of the false testimony violated the defendant's right to due
process.
Duty analysis will extend due process protection to cases in which
the necessary knowledge would not be attributed to the prosecution. For
example, in United States v. Wallach,120 the Second Circuit granted relief
based on the prosecutors' failure to investigate and discover that certain
testimony was false. In Wallach, a prosecution witness testified falsely
that he had stopped gambling at the government's request.12 At trial, the
defense produced evidence that the witness had in fact continued to
gamble.122 The prosecution disregarded the defense evidence. Although
the prosecutors should have "been on notice" that the witness was
committing perjury, they took no steps to investigate and did not correct
the witness's false denials.1 23 Further, the prosecution rehabilitated the
witness on redirect examination by permitting him to explain away the
defense evidence of his continued gambling.' 24 The prosecutors had no
actual knowledge of the falsity, and the knowledge of the lay witness
would not be imputed to the prosecution. Nevertheless, the court

not shared with the prosecutors); United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753, 761 (1st Cir.
1991) (referring to prosecutor's duty to find favorable evidence). See also Jonathan M.
Fredman, Intelligence Agencies, Law Enforcement, and the Prosecution Team, 16 YALE
L. & POL'Y REv. 331, 349-50 (1998) (discussing prosecution's duty to discover
exculpatory evidence); Hans P. Sinha, ProsecutorialEthics: The Duty to Disclose
Exculpatory Material, 22 PROSECUTOR 20, 27 (Mar. 2008) (citing Kyles for the
proposition that the prosecutor is responsible for information in the hands of the police).
116. Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1075 (9th Cir. 2008).
117. Id. at 1072.
118. Id. at 1074-75.
119. Id.
120. 935 F.2d 445, 456 (2d CiT. 1991).
121. Id. The witness was later convicted of perjury based on that false testimony.
122. Wallach, 935 F.2d at 457 (2d Cir. 1991).
123. Id See also Shih Wei Su v. Filion, 335 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2003). In Shih Wei Su,
the Second Circuit confronted a similar situation and turned to the concept of duty rather
than attribution, stating that "before a prosecutor puts to the jury evidence that a witness
has made no deal with the government, he or she has a fundamental obligation to
determine whether that is so." 335 F.3d at 127. The court also referred to the
prosecutor's "duty to avoid eliciting false testimony." Id.
124. Wallach, 935 F.2d at 457 (2d Cir. 1991).
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concluded that the prosecution violated the defendant's right to due
process by failing to fulfill the duty to discover and correct the false
testimony. 125 In other cases, the duty to investigate may similarly be
triggered by a defense motion or by other information that comes into the
hands of the prosecution and make the prosecution responsible for
knowledge that would not otherwise be imputed to it. 126
Like knowingly using false testimony, negligently using false
testimony suggests prosecutorial wrongdoing: the court determines that
the particular prosecutor failed to fulfill her constitutional obligations to
fairness by conducting the necessary inquiry.12 7 Reliance on this
standard may lead a court to deny a defendant relief out of reluctance to
find prosecutorial fault or to impose what the court regards as an onerous
burden on prosecutors. 128
A duty approach should encourage the prosecution to exercise due
diligence in its own pretrial investigation. For example, suppose the
prosecution does not conduct a careful record check and erroneously
informs the defense that a particular witness does not have a criminal
record, believing it to be true. A court is unlikely to attribute the
information contained in court records to the prosecution. However, if
the court applies duty analysis, the court is likely to conclude that the
prosecution was negligent and should have known of the record.12 9

125. See also Drake v. Portuondo, 553 F.3d 230, 240 n.5 (2d Cir. 2009) (pointing out
that in Wallach, the prosecutors may have been consciously avoiding the knowledge of
falsity).
126. See also United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1503-04 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(finding defense request for specific information triggered government duty to review
local police department files).
127. See United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970-71 (3d Cir. 1991)
(characterizing the prosecutor's failure to exercise due diligence to uncover witness's
criminal conviction as "conduct unworthy of the United States Attorney's Office"). See
also Henning, supra note 15, at 766 (arguing that reliance on negligence standard invites
inquiry into prosecutorial motives). Cf Hollman v. Wilson, 158 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir.
1998) (concluding that defendant must establish something more than governmental
mistake to prevail on Brady claim).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph, 996 F.2d 36, 41 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting
defendant's claim in part because of unwillingness to "interpret Brady to require
prosecutors to search their unrelated files to exclude the possibility, however remote, that
they contain exculpatory information", and noting that such a requirement would place an
unreasonable burden on prosecutors). See also United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500,
1503-04 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (discussing reasonableness of burden to determine whether
non-disclosure of evidence in police files and not discovered by prosecutor supported
Brady claim); Carole Gordon Rapoport, Dream Team or Evidentiary Nightmare?
Defining When a Government Agency is Part of the Prosecution Team, 9 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & App. ADVOC. 81, 96-97 (2004) (citing burden imposed on prosecutors by broad
definition of prosecution team).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Duke, 50 F.3d 571, 578 (8th Cir. 1995).
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At least in theory, a duty approach should also encourage
prosecutors' offices to create a better flow of information from law
enforcement to the prosecution in order to satisfy that duty.130 However,
neither the states nor the federal government have put in place
mechanisms encouraging law enforcement to gather, record, and transmit
exculpatory evidence to the prosecution. 131 Thus, to establish robust
protection from false testimony, the courts will often have to turn to the
duty to discover or imputed knowledge to satisfy the knowledge
requirement.
3.

Imputed Knowledge

Instead of focusing solely on the prosecutor's subjective knowledge
or duty to discover, courts should view the government's knowledge
collectively and impute knowledge from other government actors to the
prosecutor to fulfill the knowledge requirement.' 32 If certain government
actors possessed evidence establishing falsity, the court should treat the
government team as having knowledge and need not determine who
actually accessed or could have discovered the evidence.

130. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995) (expressing view that
procedures could be implemented to ensure that information gets to prosecutors); Giglio
v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (suggesting that prosecution offices could
establish procedures and regulations "to insure communication of all relevant information
on each case to every lawyer who deals with it"); United States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901,
904-05 (9th Cir. 1996) (exhorting prosecutors to personally review files rather than
relying on law enforcement personnel). See also Bibas et al., supra note 82, at 2023-25
(discussing interaction between prosecutor's offices and law enforcement); Daniel
Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L.
REv. 749, 813-20 (2003) (highlighting need for improved team interaction between
prosecution and law enforcement); Fisher, supra note 113, at 1382-84 (questioning
ability of prosecutors to obtain information in police files).
131. See Gershman, Games ProsecutorsPlay, supra note 101, at 552-53 (discussing
incentives for prosecutors not to search for exculpatory evidence); Fisher, supra note 113,
at 1414-35 (discussing lack of and barriers to such mechanisms in United States and
arguing that prosecutors do not have access to favorable evidence in police files and must
rely on "persuasion and negotiation, rather than authority"). See also id. at 1435-38
(discussing police practices that keep exculpatory evidence away from prosecutors).
132. In United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753 (1st Cir. 1991), the First Circuit
recognized the parallel between the definition of prosecution knowledge under Brady and
the imputation of knowledge within a corporation to establish corporate liability:
The criminal responsibility of a corporation can be founded on the collective
knowledge of its individual employees and agents. There is no reason why
similar principles of institutional responsibility should not be used to analyze
the actions of individual government attorneys called upon to represent the
government as an institution in matters of court-ordered disclosure obligations.
Id. at 761 (citation omitted).
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The attribution approach has been used frequently when assessing
Brady violations. 133 When assessing claims based on governmental
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, courts have not always required
either that the prosecutor had subjective knowledge of the information or
that the prosecutor should have discovered the information. Instead,
courts have held that the defendant can show a due process violation by
proving that other government actors knew of the exculpatory
evidence. 13 4 In Pennsylvaniav. Ritchie,3 5 for example, the Court treated
files in the state agency charged with child protection as if they were
known to the prosecution, even though the contents of the files were

133. See Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that
"[k]nowledge of police officers or investigators will be imputed to the prosecution");
United States v. Bhutani, 175 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that when agency is
sufficiently involved, agency knowledge will be imputed to prosecutor); United States v.
Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1208 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting in dictum that prosecutor is "presumed
to have knowledge of all information" gathered in investigation); United States v. Wood,
57 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that "[f]or Brady purposes, the FDA and the
prosecutor were one" where the agency was responsible for administering the relevant
statute and had consulted with the prosecutor on the criminal case); United States v.
Kaufmann, 783 F.2d 708, 709 n.5 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that other courts have attributed
the knowledge of another public employee to the prosecution); Wedra v. Thomas, 671
F.2d 713, 717 n.l (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that "knowledge of a police officer may be
attributable to the prosecutor if the officer acted as an arm of the prosecution"); Martinez
v. Wainwright, 621 F.2d 184, 187 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980) (using language of attribution in
discussing Brady violation). See also Reiss, supra note 78, at 1410 n.214 (collecting
cases discussing imputed knowledge); Carlson, supra note 77, at 1176-77 (arguing that
all Brady violations be assessed under a concept of state action that includes "all law
enforcement officers in the state" rather than looking for ways "to 'charge' the prosecutor
with knowledge held by others"); Hochman, supra note 89 (discussing extent to which
prosecutor will be charged with knowledge of favorable evidence).
134. See Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1074 (9th Cir. 2008):
The prosecutor is responsible for the nondisclosure of assurances made to his
principal witnesses even if such promises by other government agents were
unknown to the prosecutor. Since the investigative officers are part of the
prosecution, the taint on the trial is no less if they, rather than the prosecutor,
were guilty of nondisclosure (citations omitted).
See also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (finding possible Brady
violation based on information known to law enforcement officers but not to
prosecutor); United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753, 760-61 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding
prosecutor responsible for information in the hands of other prosecutors in the same
office or of the Federal Bureau of Investigation); United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d
334, 342 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating that "'prosecution' includes all agencies of
the federal government involved in any way in the prosecution of criminal
litigation"); Manning v. State, 884 So.2d 717, 723-24 (Miss. 2004) (granting
defendant hearing on new trial motion where defendant produced evidence that law
enforcement officers solicited perjury but offered no evidence that the prosecutor
was aware that the testimony was false). See generally Villaverde, supra note 79, at
1489-90 (discussing attribution of knowledge to prosecutor).
135. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
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privileged and had not been disclosed to the prosecutors or investigators

in the case. 136
Imputed knowledge should play at least as great a role in false
testimony cases. When the prosecution calls a witness to testify, the
government has a heightened obligation regarding information that
demonstrates that the witness testified falsely. An argument can be made
that courts should impute knowledge more broadly in the false testimony
cases. When a witness testifies for the prosecution, the government
concern with protecting against falsity is satisfied by knowledge of a far
narrower range of information than in non-disclosure cases. The focus is
only on information that counters witness's in-court testimony rather
than on any information or evidence that might prove exculpatory.
The Supreme Court recognized that imputed knowledge could
support a due process claim based on false testimony in Giglio.1 37
Invoking agency theory, the Court held that the promise made by one
prosecutor was attributed to the office as a whole. 13 8 This approach
divorces the analysis of the false testimony from notions of prosecutorial
wrongdoing or negligence. Instead of asking what the prosecutor knew
or should have known, the court simply asks whether those close enough
to the case that their knowledge is imputed to the prosecution had
knowledge that contradicted the testimony. If a government actor
possesses knowledge that would establish the falsity of a witness's
testimony, imputing that knowledge to the prosecution entitles the
defendant to have her claim evaluated under the lower materiality
standard applied in false testimony cases. The courts should therefore
address the question of imputed knowledge forthrightly and determine
when the prosecutor is responsible for information known to others in

government.1 3 9
136.
137.

Id. at 57.
405 U.S. 150, 152 (1972).

138. The Court explained, "The prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the
spokesman for the Government. A promise made by one attorney must be attributed, for
these purposes, to the Government."

Id. at 154 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

AGENCY § 272, and American Bar Association, Project on Standards for Criminal Justice,
Discovery and Procedure Before Trial § 2.1(d)).
139. See, e.g., Ex parte Castellano, 863 S.W.2d 476, 480-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)
(recognizing that knowledge of law enforcement officers may be imputed to prosecution).
See also Sinha, supra note 115, at 27 (citing Giglio for the proposition that "a prosecutor
is responsible for disclosing to the defense not only evidence he knows about, but also
information that is in the possession of other prosecutors in his office").
In Giles v. Maryland,386 U.S. 66 (1967), Justice White, concurring, also treated the
question as one of imputed knowledge, using the language of agency and attribution, not
of duty:
There is another matter for the consideration of the Maryland court: the
prosecuting attorney of Montgomery County was not charged with the
knowledge of Prince George's County officers but he was charged with what
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Despite this aspect of the reasoning in Giglio, some courts have
taken restrictive positions on when the knowledge residing elsewhere in
the government can be imputed to the prosecution and have declined to
impute knowledge from one government actor to another. 14 0 The courts
should give imputed knowledge a greater role in false testimony cases.
In addition, the courts should establish criteria to guide decisions about
when to impute knowledge.
The extent of imputation in false testimony cases should be both
broader and narrower than that called for by rules of agency.141 On one
hand, the law enforcement agencies-state and federal-with whom the
prosecution works are not generally agents of the prosecutor's office. As
a result, a strict rule of agency would circumscribe due process
protection too narrowly, allowing law enforcement to defeat due process
protection merely by withholding information from the prosecution. On
the other hand, both the prosecutor's office and the law enforcement and

the police officers of Montgomery County knew. Was he also charged with the
knowledge of other Montgomery County officials such as Lynn Adams, and, to
the extent of their involvement with Montgomery County agencies, Dr. Connor
and Dr. Doudoumopoulis?
Id at 96. See also Carlson,supra note 77, at 1175.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 78 F.3d 348, 351 (8th Cir. 1996) (declining
to impute knowledge from federal prosecutor in one state to federal prosecutor in a
different state); Pina v. Henderson, 752 F.2d 47, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1985) (summarizing
authority declining to impute knowledge from various federal agencies to prosecutor);
United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 244 (2d Cir. 1975) (declining to impute to
prosecutors knowledge of contents of tax returns filed with IRS). In Stofsky the court
also noted that the defendant could have found additional information with the exercise
of due diligence. Id. at 245. See also United States v. Steinberg, 99 F.3d 1486, 1490-91
(9th Cir. 1996). In Steinberg, the agent working on the case knew that the law
enforcement officer's testimony was false. Id. Nevertheless, the court declined to treat
the case as a false testimony case, but gave the defendant relief on the basis of the Brady
violation because the evidence withheld by the agents was material, characterizing the
case as a "close one" under that standard of materiality. Id. Instead, the court should
have imputed the agents' knowledge to the prosecutor and assessed the case under the
lower standard of materiality applied to false testimony cases.
141. Section 272 of the Second Restatement of Agency, cited in Giglio, provided:
In accordance with and subject to the rules stated in this Topic, the liability of a
principal is affected by the knowledge of an agent concerning a matter as to
which he acts within his power to bind the principal or upon which it is his duty
to give the principal information.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 272 (1958).This provision was superseded by
Section 5.04 of the Third Restatement of Agency, which provides:
For purposes of determining a principal's legal relations with a third party,
notice of a fact that an agent knows or has reason to know is imputed to the
principal if knowledge of the fact is material to the agent's duties to the
principal, unless the agent
(a) acts adversely to the principal as stated in § 5.04, or
(b) is subject to a duty to another not to disclose the fact to the principal.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY

§ 5.03

(2006).
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other investigative agencies are agents of the same sovereign. A broad
agency approach would lead to the position that all government
knowledge is imputed to the prosecution. The resulting rule would be far
broader than any recognized by the courts. It would extend to agencies
with vastly disparate responsibilities and reach information not even
available to prosecutors. 14 2
Instead, courts should determine whether to impute knowledge from
other government actors to the prosecution by looking at their connection
to the investigation and prosecution. 143 The courts' construction of the
government's discovery obligation under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides some guidance.144 Under the rules, material may be
regarded as falling within the prosecution's possession, custody or
control, and therefore subject to discovery, even when the prosecutor
does not actually possess the material. If an actor closely associated with
the criminal case possesses material that would be discoverable if
actually possessed by the prosecution, then the prosecution must disclose
it. 145
142. See Afsheen John Radsan, Remodeling the Classified Information Procedures
Act (CIPA), 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 437 (2010) (discussing discovery challenges in
terrorism cases); Richman, supra note 130, at 756-57 (describing federal agency structure
and hierarchy); Fredman, supra note 115, at 336-38 (discussing some barriers between
federal agencies). But see United States v. McVeigh, 954 F. Supp. 1441 (D. Colo. 1997)
(stating broad view of prosecutors' obligations under Brady as agents of government). In
McVeigh, the district court explained:
The lawyers appearing on behalf of the United States, speaking for the entire
government, must inform themselves about everything that is known in all of
the archives and all of the data banks of all of the agencies collecting
information which could assist in the construction of alternative scenarios to
that which they intend to prove at trial. That is their burden under Brady.
McVeigh, 954 F. Supp. at 1450.
143. See Rapoport,supra note 128 (discussing approaches).
144. See United States v. Hamilton, 107 F.3d 499, 509 n.5 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that
Brady imposes on a federal prosecutor an obligation to obtain favorable evidence from
state entities if the prosecutor is aware of the information).
145. See United States v. Jordan, 316 F.3d 1215, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003) (recognizing
that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 treats material in the hands of an investigative
agency "closely connected to the prosecutor" as within the government's custody and
control); United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
files held by the Bureau of Prisons were within prosecution possession and control given
Bureau's role providing evidence for the prosecution); United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d
1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1989) (declining either to limit obligation to material within the
particular federal district or to extend the obligation to material in the possession of any
federal agency, but holding that "prosecutor will be deemed to have knowledge of and
access to anything in the possession, custody or control of any federal agency
participating in the same investigation of the defendant"); United States v. Poulin, 592 F.
Supp. 2d 137, 143 (D. Me. 2008) (concluding that recordings of phone calls in possession
of county were within government's control where federal authorities "inherited"
prosecution from the county sheriff, had free access to the recordings, and to large extent
directed the state agency's own use of the recording system); United States v. Libby, 429
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Within the law enforcement arm of a single jurisdiction, knowledge
should be imputed to the prosecution broadly. 14 6 Giglio establishes that
knowledge is imputed to the prosecutor from all members of the
prosecutor's office.14 7 In addition, knowledge should be imputed from
the criminal investigative agencies that have contributed to the
prosecution effort148 as well as other government agencies that have
assisted in the case. 149 The prosecution should be held responsible for
F. Supp. 2d 1, 10-11 (D.D.C. 2006) (concluding that the Office of the Vice President and
the Central Intelligence Agency were sufficiently aligned with the prosecution that
material in their custody was within the prosecution's possession and control). But see
United States v. Gatto, 763 F.2d 1040, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that rule reaches
only material within actual possession of federal government); United States v. Diecidue,
448 F. Supp. 1011 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (holding that knowledge of state officers was not
imputable to federal authorities even though they participated in joint task force).
146. See, e.g., Smith v. Sec'y of New Mexico Dep't of Corr., 50 F.3d 801, 825 n.36
(10th Cir. 1995) (concluding that knowledge from two state agencies investigating
defendant should be imputed to county prosecutor); United States ex rel. Smith v.
Fairman, 769 F.2d 386, 391-92 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that Brady obligation extended to
evidence in the hands of officers aligned with the prosecution team). See also Rapoport,
supra note 128, at 98-99 (discussing threat to fairness if courts impute knowledge too
narrowly).
147. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
148. See United States v. Zuno-Arce, 44 F.3d 1420, 1427 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that
prosecution is deemed to have knowledge of information in files of agency working on
the investigation); United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 1989) (per
curiam) (recognizing that Brady obligation applies to both investigative and prosecutorial
members of prosecution team). This approach is consistent with decisions finding Brady
violations where the exculpatory evidence was in the hands of a government agency, but
not the prosecutor's office. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1169-70
(7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that Brady obligation extends to members of prosecution
team and declining to extend obligation to information in hands of other government
actors); United States v. Auten, 632 F.2d 478, 480-81 (5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting
government argument that it had not withheld criminal record of a government witness
since it had not run a criminal record check); United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 650
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that "[t]he duty of disclosure [imposed by the constitution and
by Fed. R. Crim. P. 16] affects not only the prosecutor, but the Government as a whole,
including its investigative agencies."). See also Arnold v. McNeil, 622 F. Supp. 2d 1294,
1321 (M.D. Fla. 2009), aff'd sub nom. Arnold v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 595 F.3d 1324,
1324 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (holding that corrupt officer's knowledge of his own
wrongdoing was imputed to prosecutor, supporting defendant's claim that there was a
Brady violation); Criminal Discovery in Collaborative Cross-Agency Investigations:
Does New Justice Department Guidance Create New Discovery Obligations?, 5 BNA
WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. (BNA) No. 193 (Mar. 12, 2010) (discussing connection to

case that makes agency knowledge discoverable); Villaverde, supra note 79, at 14931502 (discussing prosecution team approach in Brady cases); Hochman, supra note 89, at
1681-83 (discussing "prosecution team" approach).
149. See, e.g., Mastracchio v. Vose, 274 F.3d 590, 600 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that
police officers who provided protection were part of state prosecution team); United
States v. Wood, 57 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that FDA and the prosecutor
were one for Brady purposes where agency had worked closely with prosecutor on case);
Martinez v. Wainwright, 621 F.2d 184, 186-88 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding Brady violation
where prosecutor did not produce victim's rap sheet, which was in possession of medical
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knowledge possessed by all members of the broadly defined prosecution
team. 150 Even if the law enforcement officers are not under the authority
of the prosecution, their knowledge should be imputed to the prosecution
if they work closely with the prosecution on the case.15 1 The government
should not be permitted to avoid its obligation to correct false testimony
by cabining critical information to keep it away from the prosecution.
Further, if a law enforcement officer testifies falsely then that
officer's knowledge should be imputed to the prosecution even if the
officer is from an agency that is not at the heart of the investigation.152
examiner's office). But see United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1309 (1 Ith Cir. 1989)
(per curiam) (stating that prosecution team is limited to prosecutor and those over whom
prosecutor has authority).
150. The United States Department of Justice has addressed the question of who falls
within the prosecution team. Concluding that prosecutors' obligation to search for
exculpatory or impeaching evidence extends to material in the hands of members of the
prosecution team, the guidance memo listed factors that help determine who is a member
of the prosecution team:
* Whether the prosecutor and the agency conducted a joint investigation or shared
resources related to investigating the case;
* Whether the agency played an active role in the prosecution, including
conducting arrests or searches, interviewing witnesses, developing prosecutorial
strategy, participating in targeting discussions, or otherwise acting as part of the
prosecution team;
* Whether the prosecutor knows of and has access to discoverable information
held by the agency;
* Whether the prosecutor has obtained other information and/or evidence from the
agency;
* The degree to which information gathered by the prosecutor has been shared
with the agency;
* Whether a member of an agency has been made a Special Assistant United
States Attorney;
* The degree to which decisions have been made jointly regarding civil, criminal,
or administrative charges; and
* The degree to which the interests of the parties in parallel proceedings diverge
such that information gathered by one party is not relevant to the other party.
David W. Ogden, Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. to Dep't Prosecutors,
Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery_(Jan. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/dag/discovery-guidance.html [hereinafter Ogden Memo]. See
generally David E. Roth et al., Memo to Prosecutors: DOJ Focuses on Discovery
Obligations, 25-SUM CIuM. JUST. 4, 9-10 (2010) (discussing Ogden Memo and concept
of prosecution team).
151. See, e.g., United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 568-70 (5th Cir. 1979)
(reasoning that knowledge of state investigators who cooperated in joint investigation
should be imputed to federal prosecutors). But see United States v. Combs, 267 F.3d
1167, 1175-76 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting division of authority concerning whether
information in files of other government agencies is subject to Brady and declining to
decide whether government was responsible for information in Pretrial Services report
related to witness); United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1218 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding
failure to disclose presentence report of government did not violate Brady).
152. See United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55, 57-58 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding prosecution
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The prosecution's reliance on the testimony of any law enforcement
employee should charge the prosecution with that witness' knowledge of
falsity. Otherwise, a defendant may too easily fall victim to governmentgenerated false testimony. For example, in United States v. Williams,13
a government forensic expert testified falsely about his qualifications.
The court evaluated the defendant's claim as establishing false testimony
not known to the prosecution.' 54 Instead, the court should have treated
the defendant as having established knowing use of false testimony."5
The prosecution should not be able to deny responsibility for the false
testimony when a law enforcement witness embellishes his credentials or
The witness's
otherwise presents false information to the jury.
integration into the investigation and trial should lead the courts to
impute the witness's knowledge to the prosecution.
It is less clear whether information in the hands of government
agents from the same jurisdiction but not related to the particular case
should be imputed to the prosecution. 156 However, since the issue is not
wrongdoing, but fairness, the courts should give robust protection,
responsible under Brady for exculpatory evidence in Post Office employee's personnel
file). The courts do not always impute such knowledge. See United States v. Williams,
233 F.3d 592, 593 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (treating false testimony by government forensic
expert as unknowing use of false testimony). See also Hochman, supra note 89, at 168384 (discussing "readily available" approach under Brady). In United States v. Massac,
867 F.2d 174, 178-79 (3d Cir. 1989), the Third Circuit treated false testimony by an
officer as a basis for a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence of perjury
and not as a basis for a constitutional violation.
153. Williams, 233 F.3d at 593. See also United States v. Stewart, 323 F. Supp. 2d
606, 616-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). In Stewart, the court declined to attribute to the
prosecution the knowledge of a forensic expert from the Secret Service lab even though
the expert had provided support to the prosecution as they prepared for trial. Id. at 618.
The expert assisted in the end of the investigation by working with FBI agents to
supervise the defense experts as they gathered ink samples, was designated as a witness
for the prosecution, and helped the prosecutors anticipate the likely defense forensic
testimony. Id at 616. At trial, in addition to providing testimony, he was in court during
the defense expert's testimony and suggested cross-examination questions to the
prosecutor, who could not recall whether he used them. Id. at 616-17.
154. Williams, 233 F.3d at 593-94.
155. See In re Investigation of West Virginia State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div.,
438 S.E.2d 501, 505 (W. Va. 1993) (concluding that prosecution was responsible for
false testimony of expert witness from State Police Crime Lab even though not aware of
the falsity). But see Stevenson v. State, 473 A.2d 450, 450-52 (Md. 1984) (treating case
as one of ordinary newly discovered evidence where defendant learned that state's
forensic expert lied about credentials).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255-56 (2d Cir. 1998)
(limiting extent of imputed knowledge under Brady); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d
924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that knowledge of federal agents who did not work on
the case in question would not be imputed to prosecution team). In Avellino, the Second
Circuit expressed concern that extending imputation to agencies that were not involved in
the prosecution would impose too great a burden on the prosecutor to unearth the
information. Avellino, 136 F.3d at 255-56.
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imputing knowledge possessed by any law enforcement agent in the
same jurisdiction to the prosecution. For instance, in United States v.
Quinn,'57 the defendant was prosecuted by federal authorities in New
York for stock fraud. The Second Circuit held that he was not entitled to
relief where the prosecutors in New York had allowed false testimony to
stand uncorrected because they were unaware of a sealed indictment
returned by a federal grand jury in Florida charging their key witness
with stock fraud.' 58 The court asserted-correctly--that to impute
knowledge from anywhere in the federal government to the prosecution
would be absurd. However, the court seemed to similarly reject as
absurd the imputation of knowledge from one prosecutor to another
within the Justice Department. 15 9 Instead, the court should have
recognized that both United States Attorney's Offices were part of the
same large office and should have imputed knowledge from one to the
other. If the trial was unfair because the jury was not informed of the
sealed indictment, the court should have ascribed to the Justice
Department's responsibility for the critical piece of information and
concluded that the defendant did not receive due process.
The result would not be imputation of knowledge throughout the
federal government; imputation would still be circumscribed. For
example, in United States v. Pelullo,160 a non-disclosure case, the court
stated as a general principle "that the prosecution is only obligated to
disclose information known to others acting on the government's behalf
in a particular case." 1 6 1 The court concluded that the Pension and
Welfare Benefits Administration (PWBA), the civil arm of the United
States Department of Labor, was not a member of the prosecution team,
so there was no due process obligation to disclose favorable information
in the hands of the PWBA, even though the criminal arm of the
Department of Labor was working on the defendant's prosecution.1 6 2
Similarly, information held by regulatory agencies not involved in the
specific case should not be imputed to the prosecution.' 63 In Pina v.
157. United States v. Quinn, 445 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1971).
158. Id. at 943-944.
159. Id at 944.
160. United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2005).
161. Id. at 218.
162. The court expressed concern about the practical challenge facing the prosecution
given the defendant's multiple fraud schemes, spread both geographically and
temporally. Id. at 210-11.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1169-70 (7th Cir. 1996)
(concluding in non-disclosure case that knowledge of exculpatory evidence held by
Office of Thrift Supervision, Securities Exchange Commission, or Internal Revenue
Service would not be imputed to prosecution where prosecutors did not have actual
knowledge of the information and the regulatory agencies had not worked as part of
prosecution team).
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Henderson,'64 the Second Circuit reversed the district court holding that
knowledge would be imputed from a parole officer to the prosecutor.
The parole officer was neither a member of the prosecution team nor an
employee of the government agencies involved in the prosecution, and,
as the court noted, "did not work in conjunction with either the police or
the prosecutor."16 5
Knowledge in the hands of other sovereign jurisdictions, however,
should not routinely be imputed to the prosecution. A prosecutor
operating in one jurisdiction should be responsible for information in the
hands of the law enforcement representatives from the other jurisdiction
only if they are sufficiently involved in the investigation or
prosecution. 166 In United States v. Risha,167 the Third Circuit suggested
three factors to consider when determining whether to impute knowledge
from actors in one jurisdiction to a prosecutor in a different jurisdiction
when evaluating a claim for non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence:
(1) whether the party with knowledge of the information is acting on the
government's "behalf' or is under its "control"; (2) the extent to which
state and federal governments are part of a "team," are participating in a

164. Pina v. Henderson. 752 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985).
165. Id. at 49.
166. See United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 569-70 (5th Cir. 1979) (imputing
knowledge from state investigators to federal prosecutors with whom they had worked on
case). See also Moreno-Morales v. United States, 334 F.3d 140, 146-47 (1st Cir. 2003)
(holding that federal prosecutors were not required to turn over information in sealed
minutes of Puerto Rican Senate); United States v. Beers, 189 F.3d 1297, 1304 (10th Cir.
1999) (stating that "[i]nformation possessed by other branches of the federal government,
including investigating officers, is typically imputed to the prosecutors of the case," but
refusing to charge federal prosecutors with knowledge of materials in the possession of a
state police department); United States v. Young, 20 F.3d 758, 764-65 (7th Cir. 1994)
(refusing to impute knowledge of witness's criminal record to prosecution where
prosecution had conducted diligent search and failed to find state conviction). See also
United States v. Marshall, 132 F.3d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that evidence in
possession of county was not subject to disclosure under Rule 16); United States v.
Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1150 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that records of guilt pleas entered
in state court were not within federal prosecutors' possession and control); Thor v. United
States, 574 F.2d 215, 220-21 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that material in possession of local
police was not within prosecution's possession and control for purposes of Rule 16). See
generally Richman, supra note 130, at 768 (discussing increase in level of state-federal
cooperation). See also Ogden Memo, supra note 150:
Many cases arise out of investigations conducted by multi-agency task forces
or otherwise involving state law enforcement agencies. In such cases,
prosecutors should consider (1) whether state or local agents are working on
behalf of the prosecutor or are under the prosecutor's control; (2) the extent to
which state and federal governments are part of a team, are participating in a
joint investigation, or are sharing resources; and (3) whether the prosecutor has
ready access to the evidence.
Id.
167. United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2006).
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"joint investigation" or are sharing resources; and (3) whether the entity
charged with constructive possession has "ready access" to the
evidence.1 68 A consideration of those factors will indicate whether the
connection between the actors in the two different jurisdictions warrants
imputation of knowledge.
In United States v. Antone, 169 for example, a prosecution witness in
a federal trial testified falsely that he had hired his attorney with his own
funds. In fact, the State of Florida had paid for his attorney. The
payment had arisen from the work of a joint federal-state task force, but
the federal authorities did not know of the arrangement. 7 0 Citing the
cooperation of the state and federal actors in the joint investigation, the
court concluded that knowledge of the agreement should be imputed to
the federal prosecutor. 171
The imputed knowledge approach offers some advantages. First,
the court avoids the challenges of assessing subjective knowledge and of
determining prosecution wrongdoing. The court merely makes an
objective factual assessment of who had the information and their
relationship to the investigation and prosecution. Further, this approach
ensures that the government cannot disadvantage the defendant by
compartmentalizing information or withholding information from the
prosecutor, thereby allowing the prosecutor to present false testimony
and deny knowledge of the contrary evidence.
Of course, the determination that the prosecution had knowledge of
falsity based on rules imputing knowledge to the prosecution may
overlap to a significant degree with the determination based on the
prosecutor's duty to discover information, discussed in the next
section.172 In some cases, however, the outcome will turn on whether the
court relies on the prosecutor's duty to discover or simply imputes
168. Id. at 304. These factors closely parallel the factors suggested by the Ogden
Memo to guide determination of who belongs to the prosecution team in a given case for
purposes of defining the prosecution's discovery obligations. See Ogden Memo, supra
note 150.
169. United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1979).
170. Id. at 568.
171. Id. at 569-70. In Risha, the court remanded for determination of whether
knowledge of the witness' arrangement with state authorities, which led to a favorable
disposition of criminal charges against him in an unrelated state case, should be imputed
to the federal prosecutors, imposing on them the obligation of disclosing the favorable
evidence. Risha, 445 F.3d at 306.
172. See, e.g., Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1073-75 (9th Cir. 2008). In
Jackson, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the prosecutor would have known the
testimony was false had the prosecutor fulfilled his duty to investigate, but also discussed
the agency theory recognized in Napue and Giglio and concluded that the due process
clause was violated because other members of the prosecution team were aware of the
correct information, even though the prosecutor was not. Id at 1072-75. The Jackson
court did not differentiate between these two lines of reasoning. Id.
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knowledge. For example, in Arnold v. Secretary, Department of
Corrections,173the basis for the defendant's claim was the prosecution's
failure to disclose the course of criminal conduct in which the lead
investigator was engaged. The court acknowledged that the prosecutor
would not have discovered the evidence through the exercise of due
diligence because the detective was actively concealing his criminal
acts.174 Instead of relying on a failure to fulfill a duty to investigate, the
court held that the detective's knowledge of his own criminality was
imputed to the prosecutor. 175
B.

EstablishingFalsity

Courts also narrow protection from false testimony by defining the
required falsity narrowly and by demanding a high level of proof from
the defendant. The courts should recognize that a due process violation
may occur even if the witness is not aware that the testimony is false or if
the testimony is misleading but not technically false. Further, the courts
should set the standard for proving falsity at an attainable level,
recognizing the difficulty of gathering proof where the government has
relied on false testimony and suppressed information essential to
assessing the defendant's guilt.
1.

Defining Falsity

The concept of falsity in the false testimony cases should be
construed broadly. The due process clause is not limited to protecting
against the use of perjured testimony. Instead, the protection should
encompass any inaccuracy that would tend to corrupt the truth-finding
process and may include information elicited by the defense on cross-

173. Arnold v. McNeil, 622. F. Supp. 2d 1294 (M.D. Fla. 2009), affd sub nom.
Arnold v. Sec'y, Dep't ofCorr., 595 F.3d 1324, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
174. Id. at 1313-14. See also Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1164-65 (10th Cir.
1999) (addressing defendant's allegation that officers planted evidence and noting that
knowledge would be imputed to prosecution; it seems unlikely that prosecutor would
have discovered police misconduct); Crivens v. Roth, 172 F.3d 991, 996-98 (7th Cir.
1999) (concluding prosecution suppressed favorable information, without addressing how
hard it would have been for prosecution to obtain the information, because the
information was held by a state agency). But see United States v. Hawkins, 78 F.3d 348,
351 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding that finding information possessed by federal prosecutor
in a different state would have exceeded duty, but also declining to impute knowledge
even though both prosecutors were agents of the federal government). In Hawkins, the
court should have imputed the knowledge to the prosecutors in Hawkins' case regardless
of whether due diligence would have led them to the information. Id.
175. Arnold, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (citing Freeman v. Georgia,
599 F.2d 65, 69 (5th Cir. 1979).
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examination as well as by the prosecution on direct examination.' 7 6 Due
process should protect against all forms of misleading testimony that
goes uncorrected by the prosecution.
Courts sometimes limit due process to protection from the knowing
use of perjured testimony by the prosecution.'77 The courts have been
led in this direction by the Court's inaccurate statement in dictum in
Agurs, where the Court characterized the violation as the use of perjured
testimony.'7 8 This characterization overstated the falsity requirement,
failing to recognize that earlier decisions implementing this strain of due
process protection were based on misleading testimony, not perjury. 79
Led by this statement of the law, however, courts sometimes turn to
perjury laws for the definition of falsity in this context.'8 0 The courts
should not apply the strict standards that have been developed in the
context of perjury prosecutions that require the defendant to prove
perjury. The definition of perjury has been developed to determine when
a witness should be criminally liable for testifying falsely under oath.
The resulting perjury standard is too restrictive to adequately protect
defendants against the corrupting impact of false testimony. The

176. In United States v. O'Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 894 (5th Cir. 1997), the Fifth Circuit
asserted that due process would not be violated by an uncorrected false statement elicited
on cross-examination. This claim is clearly erroneous. A number of cases, including
Giglio, focus due process analysis on false testimony on cross-examination. See, e.g.,
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Carter v. Mitchell, 443 F.3d 517, 535-36
(6th Cir. 2006); Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 268 (1st Cir. 1995).
177. See, e.g., United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1208 (11th Cir. 2010) (saying
that due process violation requires proof of perjury and citing perjury case); United States
v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 183 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that defendant must establish
perjury to demonstrate due process violation); Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 343 (6th Cir.
1998) (stating that testimony must be "actually perjured").
178. 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). See also supra Section II.B.
179. See supra Section II.B. See also Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 1566-72 (arguing
that this statement in Agurs redirected the development of the law).
180. See, e.g., McNair, 605 F.3d at 1208 (saying that due process violation requires
proof of perjury and citing perjury case); Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 183 (stating that
defendant must establish perjury to demonstrate due process violation); Coe, 161 F.3d at
343 (stating that testimony must be "actually perjured"); Mastracchio v. Vose, 274 F.3d
590, 603 n.5 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing cases involving prosecution for perjury for
proposition that falsity requirement should be narrowly construed); United States v.
Edinborough, 379 F. App'x 271 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying elements of perjury to false
testimony claim); Smith v. Wainwright, 741 F.2d 1248 (11th Cir. 1984) (rejecting claim
because defendant had not alleged government subornation of perjury); Alvarez v. United
States, 808 F. Supp. 1066, 1084-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (concluding alleged falsity did not
rise to the level of perjury and citing cases involving convictions for perjury and false
statement); Scott v. Foltz, 612 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D.C. Mich. 1985) (reporting that state
court had denied relief because the testimony was not "technically perjury"). See also
United States v. Tierney, 947 F.2d 854, 860 (8th Cir. 1991) (asking whether testimony
was perjured); Lynd, supra note 7, at 563 (arguing that Napue requires defendant to show
testimony was actually perjured).
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definition of perjury departs from the appropriate due process standard in
two ways. First, perjury requires that the witness knows the testimony is
false.' 8 ' Second, testimony constitutes perjury only if it is demonstrably
false and not if it merely misleads the jury.182 Neither of these
limitations should apply to false testimony cases.
First, the courts should recognize that the defendant's right to due
process may be violated even if the witness is unaware of the falsity
provided the prosecutor knows or should know the testimony is false. 83
The prosecution is not permitted to obtain a conviction by relying on a
mistaken witness that misleads the jury. The fairness of the trial is
equally compromised if the witness believes the testimony is accurate,
but the prosecution knows or should know it was false. For example, in
Hayes v. Brown, before trial the prosecution struck a deal with the
witness' attorney. The prosecution agreed to dismiss pending felony
charges after the witness testified, but asked the attorney not to tell the
witness.' 84 Having done so, the prosecution represented to the trial judge
that there was no deal and elicited testimony from the witness at trial
denying that there was a deal. The prosecution did not correct the
resulting false testimony.'85 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
defendant was entitled to habeas relief.'8 6
The State argued
unsuccessfully that the witness' ignorance precluded a finding that due
181. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006) (defining perjury as making a false statement
that the witness does not believe to be true); 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (2006) (criminalizing the
act of knowingly making a false statement); United States v. Reveron Martinez, 836 F.2d
684, 689 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that to establish perjury government must prove
statement was "knowingly" false, that defendant believed testimony was false). See also
Edinborough, 379 F. App'x 271 (finding no perjury in absence of evidence that witness
had willful intent to give false testimony); Grant v. Ricks, Nos. 00-CV-6861 JBW and
03-MISC-0066 JBW, 2003 WL 21847238, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2003) (rejecting false
testimony claim in part because witness could have believed truth of misleading
testimony).
182. See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 360-62 (1973) (holding that
witness does not commit perjury if the testimony is literally true, even if misleading);
United States v. Cook, 489 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that perjury conviction
cannot be based on statement that is misleading but literally true).
183. See United States v. Rivera Pedin, 861 F.2d 1522, 1530 n.14 (11th Cir. 1988)
(rejecting argument that prosecutor was not required to correct false testimony because he
believed witness thought it was true); 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
497 (1999) ("As lower courts have noted, it matters not whether the witness giving false
testimony was mistaken or intentionally lying. If the prosecution knows that the
witness's statement is untrue, it has a duty to correct it."); Saltzburg, supra note 13, at
1560 (noting that in Napue Supreme Court was not concerned with whether witness knew
testimony was false).
184. Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (noting that the
prosecutor took these steps to enable the witness to deny the deal under oath without
perjuring himself).
185. Id. at 980.
186. Id. at 988.
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process was violated.187 The court emphasized that the constitution
protects against the use of testimony that the prosecutor knew or should
The
have known was false, not merely perjured testimony. 8
prosecution cannot use the witness as its unwitting tool that presents the
false testimony convincingly because the prosecution keeps the witness
in the dark. 18 9 Second, due process may be violated by testimony that
misleads the jury while skirting actual falsity. Courts sometimes impose
a high standard for falsity.1 90 However, the Supreme Court recognized
the corrupting impact of misleading testimony in Alcorta and granted
relief because the prosecutor's questioning of a key witness created a
187. Id. at 980-81.
188. Id. at 980.
189. Id. at 981; People v. Potter, 894 N.E.2d 490, 496-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)
(concluding that state allowed jury to be misled where witness testified there was no
agreement but facts suggested prosecution manipulation since morning after she testified
witness pleaded guilty and prosecution reduced charges and recommended probation
based on her testimony in defendant's case); People v. Nino, 665 N.E.2d 847, 853-54
(1996) (concluding that prosecution purposely manipulated timing of witness's guilty
plea to allow witness to appear in "misleading light"). See also Phillips v. Woodford,
267 F.3d 966, 984 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing prosecutor's practice of "insulating"
witnesses from information about promises of favorable treatment). But see Willhoite v.
Vasquez, 921 F.2d 247, 250 (9th cir. 1990) (concluding prosecution had no obligation to
correct testimony that witness thought was true because witness did not know about
deal); Hayes, 399 F.3d at 990 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tallman, J. dissenting) (concluding that
false testimony was not material because the witness' credibility would have been
unaffected by evidence of a deal as to which he was ignorant). In some cases, the
prosecution can successfully avoid a false testimony claim by keeping the cooperating
witness in the dark as to the likely ultimate sentence. See, e.g., Ferrell v. State, 29 So. 3d
959, 977-78 (Fla. 2010) (finding no violation where witness testified and prosecutor
argued that witness faced a ten-year sentence even though witness was ultimately
sentenced to a mere one and a half years, but defendant could not establish agreement
that contradicted testimony and argument).
190. See, e.g., Abdus-Samad v. Bell, 420 F.3d 614, 626 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Byrd v.
Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 517-18 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that testimony must be
"indisputably false" rather than "merely misleading"); Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486,
517-18 (6th Cir. 2000) (rejecting defendant's argument that witness's testimony that there
were no pending charges was false, concluding that witness understood question as
referring to criminal charges and not to parole violation hearings); United States v.
Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036, 1042 n.4 (11th Cir. 2001):
It is not clear that Williams committed perjury, particularly with regard to pretrial preparation. As noted by the district court judge, the defense counsel's
question-"Did you meet with an agent or prosecutor to go over your proposed
testimony?"-could be understood to ask whether the witness had been
"coached." R12-134. Thus, Williams' negative response is arguably a denial
of having been unduly influenced rather than, as Dickerson contends, an
answer to the simple query whether he had met at all with any Government
agent before the trial.
See also Cassidy, supra note 103, at 1163-64 (assuming that the Constitution is not
violated if prosecutor presents misleading testimony concerning inducements to witness).
Professor Cassidy goes on to argue that Giglio should be construed to extend to implied
as well as express inducements. Id. at 1166-67.
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false impression even though the witness' testimony was not actually
false.1 91 Following this precedent, the courts should recognize that lay
jurors may be misled by testimony that is not actually false and are not
likely to parse the testimony technically to discern the truth that lies
behind misleading testimony.192
Whenever a witness's testimony actively misleads the jury, even if
technically not false, the court should assess the claim as a possible false
testimony claim.1 93 For example, in Manning v. State,' 94 the crime scene
investigator testified that a footprint in blood found at the crime scene
was not suitable for comparison to the defendant's shoe.' 95 The
investigator did not reveal that he had measured the print and discerned
that the shoe was a much smaller size than the defendant's. 19 6 While not
technically false, the witness's testimony generated the false impression
that the evidence neither inculpated nor exculpated the defendant and
should have been evaluated as a false testimony claim.' 9 7 Similarly, if a
witness testifies that she does not recall an event, such as a photo
identification, the jury may be lead to believe the event never happened.
If the prosecution knows the event took place, the prosecutor should have
the obligation to correct the jury's misimpression.' 98 Further, the
prosecutor's questioning on cross-examination may violate the
defendant's right to due process if the prosecutor manipulates the
questioning to mislead the jury.199
Finally, courts sometimes apply additional inappropriate subject
matter restrictions in false testimony cases. For example, in United
191. 355 U.S. 28 (1957). In Napue, the Court cited Alcorta as standing for the
proposition that the State violates due process if it allows false testimony to be
uncorrected, reflecting the Court's view that prosecution use of misleading but
technically true testimony may violate the defendant's due process rights. Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). See generally supra Section I.B. See also Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (holding that limitation on cross-examination violated
defendant's right to confrontation where it allowed prosecution witness to give
misleading answers in response to counsel's questions probing bias).
192. See, e.g., In re Jackson, 835 P.2d 371, 381 (Cal. 1992) (rejecting argument that
testimony was not technically false and recognizing that it could be misleading to a lay
jury).
193. See generally Gershman, Games ProsecutorsPlay, supra note 101, at 538-42
(discussing prosecution efforts to mislead while avoiding technically false testimony).
194. Manning v. State, 884 So.2d 717 (Miss. 2004).
195. Id.at 725.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 724-25 (evaluating claim as one of non-disclosure rather than false
testimony).
198. Cf McDonald v. State, 553 P.2d 171, 177 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (holding that
witness's testimony that he did not recall viewing photos was not technically false).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding
violation where prosecutor used cross-examination to create a false impression and
declined to call the witness who would have provided contrary information).
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States v. Meros,200 the Eleventh Circuit limited the protection to false
testimony that hides the witness's bias against the defendant, and held
that the protection did not extend to other types of false information
relating to credibility. 20' The court in Meros concluded that the witness'
self-serving claim that he had surrendered voluntarily was not the type of
false statement that would support a due process claim. 20 2 To the
contrary, there are no such limitations on the subject matter; the false
testimony may relate to the substance of the criminal charges or to the
witness's credibility. Any false or misleading statement regarding
credibility may encourage the jury to overestimate the witness's
credibility.203 Such false testimony permits the prosecutor to strengthen
the argument in support of the witness's credibility, actively misleading
the jury and increasing the likelihood of conviction.204 Conversely, if
revealed to the jurors, the lie may destroy the witness's credibility
altogether.20 5
Any false or misleading testimony should be sufficient to support a
due process claim. If the subject matter renders the false testimony
unimportant or tangential, the court may conclude it is not material,20 6
but the court should not invoke a narrow definition of falsity to defeat the
defendant's claim.

200. United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 1989).
201. Id.
202. Id at 1310.
203. See, e.g., Ventura v. Attorney General, 419 F.3d 1269, 1272-76 (11th Cir. 2005)
(discussing Giglio claim based on witness' false denial that he had received benefit for his
testimony); People v. Olinger, 680 N.E.2d 321, 329-31 (Ill. 1997). See also Cassidy,
supra note 103 (discussing problems posed by inducements, one of which is risk of false
testimony). The prosecution may avoid direct promises but nevertheless end up
presenting intolerably false testimony. See, e.g., Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 977 (9th
Cir. 2005) (finding due process violation although the witness was not aware of the deal
received in exchange for testimony). See also Cassidy, supra note 103 (discussing use of
implied promises to avoid either false testimony or useful impeachment material). Some
courts imply agreements based on rewards that appear to flow from the witness'
cooperation and testimony even in the absence of a proven agreement. See id at 1160-62
(criticizing this approach).
204. See, e.g., Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1163 (10th Cir. 2009); Shih Wei
Su v. Filion, 335 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2003); Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284, 289 (2d
Cir. 2002); Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 983-84 (9th Cir. 2001); Scott v. Foltz,
612 F. Supp. 50, 52 (D.C. Mich. 1985) (reporting that prosecutor argued in rebuttal to
defense closing that witness was to be believed because she had not made a bargain for
her testimony); see Cassidy, supra note 103, at 1155-56 (summarizing law and discussing
cases); see generally id at 1140-41 (discussing accomplice's motives to fabricate).
205. Alvarez v. United States, 808 F. Supp. 1066, 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing
likely impact on credibility if jury learns witness lied under oath in prior trial).
206. See infra Section III.C.
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Proving Falsity

Establishing that particular testimony was false is often challenging.
The defendant may not be aware of possible falsity until long after the
trial, when memories have faded and evidence has been lost.207 The
defendant must then muster sufficient evidence to convince the court that
the trial testimony was false. 2 08
209
For
In rare cases, irrefutable proof of falsity is readily available.
example, if a witness denied having been convicted, later-discovered
2 10
proof of a prior conviction establishes that the testimony was false.
Similarly, when the prosecution denies that a government witness
received some benefit in exchange for cooperation and as a result allows
the witness to testify falsely, the defendant may be able to obtain

207. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (defendant first learned of the
exculpatory evidence during post-conviction review in the state); Rosencrantz v. Lafler,
568 F.3d 577, 585 n.5 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting witness's weak memory at time of hearing,
ten years after trial); Drake v. Portuondo, 553 F.3d 230, 237-38 (2d Cir. 2009) ("Drake
I") (defendant discovered the evidence that the expert had lied about his credentials
through research he conducted while in prison, long after he had exhausted his direct
appeals, and the state court did not allow him to develop a record to support his
allegations that his conviction rested on perjured testimony); Mitchell v. Gibson, 262
F.3d 1036, 1064 (10th Cir. 2001) (describing information that first came to light at
evidentiary hearing ten years after conviction).
208. See Carlson, supra note 77, at 1185. Professor Carlson identified three ways of
establishing false testimony: "[W]here a key prosecution witness recants his trial
testimony on the basis of honest mistake, where a vital witness for the state admits he
perjured himself in the original trial, or where later evidence disproved trial
Id.
testimony ....
209. See, e.g., Shih Wei Su v. Filion, 335 F.3d 119, 127 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding
testimony at trial was false because it was contradicted by witness's allocution at
sentencing); United States v. Gallego, 191 F.3d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1999) (reporting that
government sent defendant letter informing him that witness had perjured himself at
trial); United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103, 1108 (11th Cir. 1995) (reporting that law
enforcement officer revealed favorable information to the defense when prosecutor did
not call him as witness); United States v. Arnold, 117 F.3d 1308, 1315-17 (11th Cir.
1997) (stating that the government had tape-recorded conversations with witnesses
establishing falsity of trial testimony); People v. Cornille, 448 N.E.2d 857, 862 (Ill. 1983)
(granting relief where witness was charged with perjury in defendant's trial and academic
transcripts established that witness who testified as prosecution expert had lied about
credentials). See also Saltzburg, supra note 13, at 1544-45 (discussing Strickler and
noting that defense first learned of evidence demonstrating false testimony in discovery
process in federal habeas case); Carlson, supra note 77, at 1185.
210. See, e.g., Crivens v. Roth, 172 F.3d 991, 997-98 (7th Cir. 1999) (convicting a
witness under an alias); Hollman v. Wilson, 158 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating the
witness' full criminal record was not known to the prosecution or defense at trial because
the convictions were under two different numbers).
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unequivocal proof of the arrangement with the witness through a
Freedom of Information Act request. 211
More often, however, the necessary proof is elusive.2 12 The
prosecution is not always forthcoming, even when the defendant
discovers some information after conviction that suggests the possibility
of false testimony at trial.2 13 In addition, the defendant's access to
discovery during the post-conviction process is limited.2 14
The difficulty of accessing strong evidence of falsity can be fatal to
the defendant's claim because courts often resist the argument that a
witness testified falsely at trial. The mere fact that the witness has given
inconsistent statements or can otherwise be impeached will not generally
persuade the court that the witness's testimony was false.2 15 Similarly,
211. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 671 (1985) (reporting that
defendant discovered proof of benefit when seeking to informant-witnesses through
Freedom of Information Act request).
212. See People v. Cornille, 448 N.E.2d 857, 862 (Ill. 1983) (discussing challenges
defendants faced when establishing that testimony at trial was false). Parkerv. Herbert,
No. 02-CV-0373, 2009 WL 2971575 (W.D.N.Y. May 28, 2009), illustrates how difficult
it can be for the defense to gain access to information that challenges a prosecution
witness. Shortly before trial, defense counsel acquired information that a key prosecution
witness was under criminal investigation and was associated in crime with the victim of
the homicide with which the defendant was charged. The trial court rejected counsel's
requests for information without appearing to give them serious consideration. As a
result, the witness was able to portray himself inaccurately as not being a drug dealer and
having no motive to lie. The prosecution built on that false image in closing argument.
About eight months after trial, the witness was indicted for a narcotics conspiracy that
had included the homicide victim. At his sentencing, the prosecution moved for a 4-level
downward departure due to his substantial assistance. Eighteen months later, the
government asked to be relieved of its obligations under the plea agreement because of
evidence implicating the witness in two homicides as well as evidence that he owed the
victim of the original homicide $25,000 at the time of his death, information that the
government possessed and did not turn over during defendant's trial.
Brady and its progeny purport to define a duty of disclosure for the prosecutor, but do not
do so effectively. The Brady test permits the prosecution to withhold favorable evidence
without running a large risk of reversal because the defendant may never discover the
undisclosed evidence. See Giannelli, supra note 90, at 603 (noting that suppression of
Brady material is unlikely to be revealed); Bibas, supra note 80, at 142 (noting that
defense lawyers often never learn of non-disclosed exculpatory evidence).
213. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 693 (2004) (reporting that even in postconviction proceedings, state continued to deny falsely that witness had cooperated with
police). But see In re W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501
(W. Va. 1993) (ruling on prosecution petition to evaluate convictions in light of
discovery that prosecution expert had testified falsely in a number of cases).
214. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. at 287 (discussing limitations on discovery
during post-conviction review); Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 294 (4th Cir. 2003)
(noting that state court denied request for discovery to support claims on post-conviction
review); Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1164-66 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing
standards for discovery and granting limited discovery hearing). See also Medwed, supra
note 7, at 659 (noting difficulty of obtaining evidentiary hearing).
215. See, e.g., United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1208-09 (11th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Ogle, 425 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2005); Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 343
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courts often decline to accept a conflict between two witnesses as
establishing falsity. 2 16 In addition, if a challenge to the falsity was raised
at trial, even if not fully explored, the court may simply defer to the
jury's assessment of credibility. 2 17
The courts should entertain claims of false testimony more readily,
scrutinizing the trial testimony when the defendant advances any
contrary evidence. For example, in Kutzner v. Johnson,218 an employee
of a local company that sold wire testified at trial that the wire used in
the homicide and found in the defendant's possession was not common
in the geographic area. 2 19 In his post-conviction challenge, the defendant
produced evidence demonstrating that the testimony was unfounded,
including documentation from the manufacturer, establishing that the
wire was commonly available in the area. 2 2 0 The court treated the new
evidence as establishing a mere inconsistency between witnesses, and not
as proof that the trial testimony was false. 22 1 The court should have
The evidence clearly
accorded great weight to the evidence.
demonstrated that the witness was wrong and hence his testimony was
false on this issue. The court should have concluded that the defendant
had produced sufficient proof of falsity to satisfy that aspect of the due

process claim. 22 2

(6th Cir. 1998) (stating that "mere inconsistencies" are not sufficient to establish a
violation of due process); Mooney v. Trombley, No. 05-CV-71329-DT, 2007 WL
2331881, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2007) (discovering defendant's evidence of falsity
consisted only of testimony of a new witness who would testify that defendant's wife had
made statements inconsistent with her testimony at trial that the defendant had assaulted
her). See also Rusin, supra note 15, at 204-05. Courts similarly disregard evidence of
failed memory. See, e.g., Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192, 1195-96 (2d Cir. 1987)
(holding that testimony was not so false that it required correction where the witness's
confusion resulted in some inaccuracies); United States v. Milikowsky, 896 F. Supp.
1285, 1297-98 (D. Conn. 1994) (concluding that witness's testimony, which was
punctuated with claims of no memory, was not false testimony that required correction).
216. See, e.g., United States v. Michael, 17 F.3d 1383, 1385 (11th Cir. 1994)
(rejecting defense argument based on disagreement between testimony of two
prosecution witnesses); Ferrell v. State, 29 So. 3d 959, 979 (Fla. 2010) (rejecting
argument based on contradiction between witnesses with no way of establishing which
was truthful).
217. See Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 585-87 (6th Cir. 2009); State v.
Goodson, 856 A.2d 1012, 1022-24 (Conn. App. 2004) (concluding that falsity was
sufficiently explored at trial).
218. Kutzner v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 605, 609 (5th Cir. 2001).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. The defendant would not have prevailed because the court concluded the
challenged fact was not material and found no evidence that the government actors knew
or should have known the evidence was false. Id.
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Recantation of trial testimony presents a particularly difficult
challenge for a defendant seeking due process relief.22 3 Courts are
reluctant to accept a witness's recantation as proof that the witness's trial
testimony was false.224 Ortega v. Duncan225 provides insight into the
assessment of recanted testimony and suggests an approach more
favorable to the defendant. In Ortega, the witness had recanted in two
other cases as well the defendant's, leading to dismissal of the charges in
both the other cases.226 The district court rejected the defendant's habeas
petition on the ground that the witness was so unworthy of belief that his
recantation was not credible. 2 27 The Second Circuit concluded that the
trial court erred by focusing solely on whether the witness's recantation
was credible.22 8 Instead, the court should have used all the information
available, including the recantation, to determine whether the witness's
trial testimony was false.2 29
223. See United States v. DiPaolo, 835 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that
recantation will be viewed with great suspicion and gathering cases); Shawn Armbrust,
Reevaluating Recanting Witnesses: Why the Red-Headed Stepchild of New Evidence
Deserves Another Look, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 75 (2008) (considering issues raised
by recantation and courts' skepticism of recantation); Harris L. Beach, Jr., Recanted
Testimony: The Red-Headed Stepchild of Criminal Trial Practice, S. C. LAWYER, at *40
(May/June 1997) (discussing challenge for defense); Janice J. Repka, Comment,
Rethinking the Standardfor New Trial Motions Based Upon Recantations as Newly
DiscoveredEvidence, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1433, 1438-40 (1986) (discussing difficulty of
establishing claim based on recantation).
224. See generally Armbrust, supra note 223, at 98-102.
225. Ortega v. Duncan, 333 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2003).
226. Id. at 104.
227. Id. at 107. The Second Circuit reported:
[T]he district court concluded that Garner had essentially no credibility, and
was "a totally compliant witness, who can be led by a questioner virtually
wherever the questioner wants him to go." Based on its observation of Garner's
demeanor on the witness stand and on discrepancies amongst his several sworn
recantations, the district court believed that Garner was "making it up as he
goes along." The court thus found that Garner's recantation of the testimony he
gave at Ortega's trial was unworthy of belief.
Id. The state court had declined to make a finding on the witness's credibility.
228. Id at 107.
229. The court explained:
It is our view that a determination that Garner's recantation was not credible is
insufficient to establish that Garner's trial testimony was not perjured. While a
recantation must be "looked upon with the utmost suspicion," its lack of
veracity cannot, in and of itself, establish whether testimony given at trial was
in fact truthful. Rather, the court must weigh all the evidence of perjury before
it, including but not limited to the recantation, before reaching this conclusion.
Id. (citation omitted).
In State v. McCallum, 561 N.W.2d 707 (Wis. 1997), the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin also articulated an approach to evaluating recanted testimony that better
protects the defendant. First, the court explained that the trial court should not resolve
the case against the defendant merely because the recantation strikes the court as less
credible than the trial testimony of the recanting witness:

0
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An additional question concerns the standard that applies when a
court must determine whether trial testimony was false. In some
instances, courts set an inappropriately high standard. For example, in
Rosencrantz v. Lafler,23 0 the Sixth Circuit rejected the defendant's false
testimony claim because the defendant had failed to show that the
challenged testimony was "indisputably false." 231 The Illinois courts
have required the defendant to produce clear and convincing evidence of
falsity.23 2 These standards set the bar too high. Instead, the courts
should apply the standard sometimes used to govern motions for a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence and ask whether the court is
reasonably satisfied that the testimony was false.233
C.

The MaterialityRequirement

The availability of relief for a defendant whose trial was infected by
false testimony will depend on whether the defendant can meet the
standard of materiality applied by the court. When the defendant
establishes the prosecution's use of false testimony, the false testimony is
material if there is any reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome.
This standard is less demanding than the standard of materiality applied

A reasonable jury finding the recantation less credible than the original
accusation could, nonetheless, have a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt
or innocence. It does not necessarily follow that a finding of "less credible"
must lead to a conclusion of "no reasonable probability of a different outcome."
Less credible is far from incredible. A finding that the recantation is incredible
necessarily leads to the conclusion that the recantation would not lead to a
reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury. However, a finding that a
recantation is less credible than the accusation does not necessarily mean that a
reasonable jury could not have a reasonable doubt. Therefore, in sum, in
determining whether there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome,
the circuit court must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that a
jury, looking at both the accusation and the recantation, would have a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. If so, the circuit court must grant a
new trial.
Id. at 711. In McCallum, the court also recognized that a conventional corroboration
requirement poses a possibly insurmountable burden for defendant and therefore defined
a more attainable standard of corroboration. The court held that defendant could satisfy
the corroboration requirement by showing: (1) there is a feasible motive for the initial
false statement; and, (2) there are circumstantial guarantees of the trustworthiness of the
recantation. Id at 711-12.
230. Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2009).
231. Id.at 584 and 587.
232. People v. Cornille, 448 N.E.2d 857, 862 (lll. 1983).
233. United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 374 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating that a new
trial based on recantation should be granted only when "the court is reasonably satisfied
that the testimony given by a material witness is false"); United States v. Lanas, 324 F.3d
894, 902-03 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that to grant a new trial based on the discovery of
false testimony, the court must be "reasonably satisfied" that the testimony was false).
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in non-disclosure cases.234 However, courts do not always give the
defendant the benefit of this favorable standard. Recognizing the
peculiar concerns raised by the use of false testimony at trial, the courts
should apply the favorable materiality standard and should also assess
materiality with care.
1.

Defining Materiality

Standards of materiality and harm fall on a spectrum.235 At the end
most friendly to the defense is the harmless error test that requires the
government to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. 236 At the
other end of the spectrum is the test commonly applied when the
defendant moves for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence: the
defendant must prove that the new evidence will probably produce a
When the defendant establishes that the
different result on retrial.
government withheld exculpatory evidence, the Court defines materiality
as a reasonable probability that the result would have been different had
the exculpatory evidence been disclosed and further defines a reasonable
238
probability as one that undermines confidence in the outcome.

234.

See supra Section II.C.

235. In Strickler v. Greene, Justice Souter discussed the various standards of
materiality:
The circuitous path by which the Court came to adopt "reasonable probability"
of a different result as the rule of Brady materiality suggests several things.
First, while "reasonable possibility" or "reasonable likelihood," the Kotteakos
standard, and "reasonable probability" express distinct levels of confidence
concerning the hypothetical effects of errors on decisionmakers' reasoning, the
differences among the standards are slight. Second, the gap between all three
of those formulations and "more likely than not" is greater than any differences
among them. Third, because of that larger gap, it is misleading in Brady cases
to use the term "probability," which is naturally read as the cognate of
"probably" and thus confused with "more likely than not." We would be better
off speaking of a "significant possibility" of a different result to characterize
the Brady materiality standard. Even then, given the soft edges of all these
phrases, the touchstone of the enquiry must remain whether the evidentiary
suppression "undermines our confidence" that the factfinder would have
reached the same result.
527 U.S. 263, 300-01 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(citations omitted). See also Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1076 (9th Cir. 2008)
(recognizing difference between materiality standard in false testimony cases and that in
undisclosed evidence cases); United States v. Duke, 50 F.3d 571, 577-78 (8th Cir. 1995)
(discussing different standards).
236. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
237. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (stating standard and collecting cases).
238. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681-82 (1985). The Court adopted this
definition of materiality from the definition of prejudice in cases where the defendant
claims ineffective assistance of counsel and must establish incompetence plus prejudice.
Id-
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In false testimony cases, the standard of materiality that applies is
less demanding, defined as any reasonable likelihood that the falsity had
an effect on the outcome. 2 39 Further, the Court has stated that this
1240
standard dictates an inquiry equivalent to the harmless error inquiry.
The Court has also made it clear that the standard applied to an ordinary
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, not based on
a constitutional violation, is more demanding than any of the materiality
standards that apply in non-disclosure or false testimony cases.241
239. United States v. Vozzella, 124 F.3d 389, 392-93 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that issue
probably did not affect outcome, but holding that defendant had satisfied the standard of
materiality that applies in false testimony cases); U.S. v. Arnold, 117 F.3d 1308, 1315
(1lth Cir. 1997) ("The standard of materiality is less stringent, however, when the
prosecutor knowingly uses perjured testimony or fails to correct testimony he or she
learns to be false."); Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 268 (1st Cir. 1995) (equating
standard in false testimony cases to traditional harmless error test). In Shih Wei Su v.
Filion, 335 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2003), the Second Circuit commented on the standard that
applies in false testimony cases:
Despite the fundamental nature of the injury to the justice system caused by the
knowing use of perjured testimony by the state, the Supreme Court has not
deemed such errors to be "structural" in the sense that they "affect [ ] the
framework within which the trial proceeds." Structural errors are those that
"'so fundamentally undermine the fairness or the validity of the trial that they
require voiding [the] result [of the trial] regardless of identifiable prejudice."'
Instead, even when a prosecutor elicits testimony he or she knows or should
know to be false, or allows such testimony to go uncorrected, a showing of
prejudice is required. But the Supreme Court has made clear that prejudice is
readily shown in such cases, and the conviction must be set aside unless there is
no "reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the
judgment of the jury."
Id. at 126-27 (citations omitted). See also Hall v. State, 650 P.2d 893, 899 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1982) (finding reasonable likelihood that perjury presented by prosecution affected
outcome).
240. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679-80. In Bagley, the Court addressed prior decisions
and clarified the meaning of the materiality standard applied in cases of false testimony:
The Court noted the well-established rule that "a conviction obtained by the
knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set
aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have
affected the judgment of the jury." Although this rule is stated in terms that
treat the knowing use of perjured testimony as error subject to harmless-error
review, it may as easily be stated as a materiality standard under which the fact
that testimony is perjured is considered material unless failure to disclose it
would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 678-80 (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 193). See also United States v. Duke, 50 F.3d
571, 577 (8th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that standard is the same). The use of different
language to express identical inquiry may be confusing. See, e.g., In re Matter of
Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 505-06
(W. Va. 1993) (discussing standard that applies in false testimony cases and treating
harmless error and reasonable likelihood inquiries as different).
241. In Bagley, the Court cited its discussion in Agurs and explained:
The Court rejected a standard that would require the defendant to demonstrate
that the evidence if disclosed probably would have resulted in acquittal. The
Court reasoned: "If the standard applied to the usual motion for a new trial
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Nevertheless, despite the Supreme Court's clear holdings, other
courts occasionally manifest confusion about the proper standard of
materiality.242 For example, in United States v. Dickerson,2 43 the
Eleventh Circuit equated the materiality requirement in false testimony
cases to the higher standard applied to non-disclosure violations not
involving falsity.244 Applying that standard, the court concluded that the
false testimony was not material, and the defendant was therefore not
entitled to relief.24 5 Application of the correct standard of materiality,
placing the burden to show lack of effect on the government rather than
imposing the burden of showing harm on the defendant, could have led
to a different outcome. It is critical that the courts apply the reasonable
likelihood standard and not a more demanding standard when the
defendant demonstrates knowing use of false testimony.
2.

Assessing Materiality

In some cases it is clear that the allegedly perjured information had
no impact on the defendant's conviction or sentence.246 In others, the
based on newly discovered evidence were the same when the evidence was in
the State's possession as when it was found in a neutral source, there would be
no special significance to the prosecutor's obligation to serve the cause of
justice." The standard of materiality applicable in the absence of a specific
Brady request is therefore stricter than the harmless-error standard but more
lenient to the defense than the newly-discovered evidence standard.
473 U.S. at 680-81 (citations omitted).
242. See, e.g., Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 745-46 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that
materiality standard in false testimony cases is the same as in non-disclosure cases and
concluding that defendant had not established that false testimony was material); Ventura
v. Attorney General, 419 F.3d 1269, 1282 (11th Cir. 2005) (discussing state court's
application of the wrong standard); Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1464 (11 th Cir.
1986) (holding that trial court committed error when it required defendant to prove that
correction of false testimony "probably would have resulted in acquittal"); Ex parte
Chabot, 300 S.W.3d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). In Chabot,the court held that the
harmless error standard required the defendant to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the falsity contributed to the conviction. Despite its confusion, the court
granted the defendant relief. In other cases, however, the court's misunderstanding of the
standard may lead to a negative outcome for the defendant. See, e.g., Ex parte Fierro,
934 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Cr. App. 1996) (treating false testimony in hearing on motion to
suppress like other false testimony but putting burden on defendant to show harm by a
preponderance). But see Ex parte Castellano, 863 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)
(applying correct standard of materiality and finding in favor of defendant).
243. United States v. Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036 (11th Cir. 2001).
244. Id.at 1041-42 (stating that "[t]he materiality element is satisfied if the false
testimony 'could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict"') (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290
(1999)).
245. Id. at 1042-43.
246. See, e.g., Cheeks v. Gaetz, 571 F.3d 680, 685-86 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that
allegedly false testimony that defendant no longer lived in the home where the murder
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court's approach to materiality determines the outcome. There are two
possible approaches: First, the court may assess the likely result had the
defense been informed of the contradictory information and the witness
testified truthfully, disclosing the facts favorable to the defendant or
acknowledging impeaching information. Alternatively, the court may
ask how the jury would have judged the case had the jurors learned that
the witness had testified falsely under oath.247 Only this second approach
accounts for the gravity and corrupting effect of false testimony.
When the court merely asks what would have happened had the
witness given truthful testimony, the court gives insufficient weight to
the witness's willingness to testify falsely or the government's
willingness to allow false testimony to stand uncorrected.248 Instead, the
court should focus on how a jury would respond upon learning that the
witness had given false testimony under oath and the prosecution had
failed to correct it. Thus, the court should assess the impact had the jury
heard the witness' false testimony, learned it was false, and, further,
learned about the government's awareness of the falsity. 2 49 The likely
impact would be the destruction of the witness's overall credibility as
well as the credibility of the prosecution itself, an impact beyond that of
the truthful testimony alone. 25 0 Analyzing the impact of the false
251
testimony in this way, a court is more likely to find materiality.
occurred had no influence on conviction of first degree murder and was harmless error as
to the sentence because defendant's sentences were to be served concurrently).
247. A third approach would be to ask whether the evidence without the false
testimony was sufficient to uphold the conviction. See, e.g., In re Matter of Investigation
of W. Va. State Police Crime Laboratory, Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 506 (W. Va.
1993) (directing lower courts to determine whether defendants in whose trials a state
forensic expert had testified falsely would have been convicted in any event without the
false testimony). The Court made it clear that this is not appropriate in Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419,434-35 (1995).
248. See, e.g., Cheeks, 571 F.3d at 685-86 (discussing only what impact truthful
testimony would have had on outcome and not considering impact on witness's
credibility had jury learned she had lied under oath at trial). In some cases, the
government concedes perjury, or even calls it to the defendant's attention. See also
United States v. Gallego, 191 F.3d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1999) (criticizing trial court for
rejecting defendant's challenge to conviction in part by hypothesizing evidence that the
prosecution could use on retrial to replace the perjured testimony).
249. See, e.g., Ortega v. Duncan, 333 F.3d 102, 109 (2d. Cir 2003) (concluding that
jury would have been unlikely to convict had it learned of the witness's perjury); United
States v. Mazzanti, 925 F.2d 1026, 1030 n.6 (7th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that focus on
how jury would have reacted had perjury been revealed at trial may be more favorable to
defendant). Cf United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 336 (9th Cir. 1993)
(acknowledging likely impact on credibility if jury learns witness lied).
250. The Second Circuit took this approach in United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d
445(2d Cir. 1991), explaining:
[The witness] was the centerpiece of the government's case. Had it been
brought to the attention of the jury that [the witness] was lying after he had
purportedly undergone a moral transformation and decided to change his ways,
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A court that asks only what would have happened if contradictory
evidence had been in the hands of the defense before the witness testified
is less likely to conclude that the false testimony was material.252 For
example, in Hollman v. Wilson,25 3 a prosecution witness denied having a
criminal record, knowing that a clerical error had "seemingly purged a
portion of his criminal past." 2 54 Rather than ask how the jurors would
have viewed his credibility had they learned that the witness had
intentionally lied under oath, the court asked only what would have
his entire testimony may have been rejected by the jury. It was one thing for
the jury to learn that [the witness] had a history of improprieties; it would have
been an entirely different matter for them to learn that after having taken an
oath to speak the truth he made a conscious decision to lie.
Id. at 457. Further, in closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized the witness' motive
to be truthful. Id. at 459. See also Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008)
(looking at total impact of falsity); United States v. Seijo, 514 F.2d 1357, 1364 (2d Cir.
1975) (commenting that witness's lie concerning lack of criminal record cast more doubt
on testimony than proof of criminal record would have). In Jackson, the Ninth Circuit
explained:
The State underestimates the impeachment value that the prosecutor's
correction of McFarland's testimony could have served. Both the district court
and the state court referee found that McFarland would likely have been
thoroughly discredited. A jury could easily find that McFarland, facing an
unknown sentence for a serious crime, would greatly appreciate the chance to
serve out his sentence close to his family and hence would find significant
value in the prosecutor's promise. Moreover, although the witness had been
cross-examined about his own attempts to benefit from his cooperation,
evidence of an explicit promise of assistance by the trial prosecutor likely
would have carried far greater weight than any speculative benefit McFarland
might have thought he could achieve on his own. Moreover, that McFarland
was willing to perjure himself in order to cover up prosecutor Marin's promise
would surely have called into question the truth of all of his testimony.
Jackson, 513 F.3d at 1076.
251. See, e.g., Kyles, 514 U.S. at 441-45 (discussing materiality assessment). See also
Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 584 (6th Cir. 2009). In Rosencrantz, a witness
testified falsely that she had not met with the prosecution before trial. The court properly
rejected the prosecution argument that the false testimony was not material because the
witness's testimony was already riddled with inconsistencies. The court explained that
"exposing Lasky as untruthful-thereby tipping the jury to another of Lasky's
inconsistencies and her willingness to lie under oath-would have affected the jury's
view of Lasky's credibility." Id. at 588. Indeed, had the jury learned of the meeting with
the prosecution after hearing the witness's false testimony, the jury might then have been
concerned about the level of prosecution pressure applied to obtain the favorable trial
testimony. The jury might also have viewed the prosecutor's conduct as evidence that
the prosecutor believed the case was weak.
252. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 233 F.3d 592 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In Williams,
a government forensic expert testified falsely about his qualifications, and the court asked
whether the government would be able to obtain a conviction at a new trial, concluding
that the government could rely on other witnesses to do so. Id. at 595. Instead, the court
should have asked what would have happened had the perjury of the government witness
been revealed in the initial trial, an evaluation that may have led to a different result.
253. Hollman v. Wilson, 158 F.3d 177, 182 (3d Cir. 1998).
254. Id. at 182.
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happened had the defense known of the criminal history and used it to
impeach the witness at trial.255 The court speculated that the witness
would not have lied had he known that the defense had that
information.2 56 The impact of proven perjury would be much greater
than mere impeachment with a prior conviction.
Similarly, in Guzman v. State,257 a restrictive assessment of
materiality yielded the conclusion that the false testimony was not
material. In Guzman, both the prosecution's key witness and the
detective who paid her a $500 reward for turning the defendant in
testified falsely at trial that she had received no benefit for her
cooperation. 258 The court concluded that the false testimony was not
material because the witness had been impeached in other ways.25 Had
the court instead asked what would have happened had the jury learned
that both the witness and the detective had committed perjury in the trial
and that the prosecution had knowingly allowed the perjury to go
uncorrected the court would more likely have granted the defendant
relief 260 The lower materiality standard reflects the concerns raised by
the use of false testimony, and it should be applied in a manner that
likewise reflects the corrupting power of such testimony.

255. Id
256. The court explained its assessment of materiality as follows:
Hollman contends that the harm created by the purported Brady violation was
exacerbated because Dawkins escaped challenge for his perjury on the stand. It
is true that Dawkins perjured himself by not revealing that he did have a
criminal record but this does not give rise to separate rights under Brady.
Further, we note that had all the parties had Dawkins's full criminal history, it is
unlikely that he would have testified that he had no record. Rather, it appears
that Dawkins was attempting to benefit from the clerical error which seemingly
purged a portion of his criminal past.
Id. at 182.
257. Guzman v. State, 941 So.2d 1045, 1048-49 (Fla. 2006).
258. Id at 1048.
259. The court concluded that the false testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 1049.
260. See id. at 1056 (Anstead, J. dissenting). See also Lewis v. Erickson, 946 F.2d
1361 (8th Cir. 1991). In Lewis, the rape victim testified in the defendant's trial that she
had no doubt about identification of her two attackers. In the co-defendant's separate
trial, she recanted and testified that she could not identify him. 946 F.2d at 1362. The
Minnesota court denied the defendant's request for relief because it viewed the
recantation as mere impeachment evidence that was insufficient to lead to a different
outcome. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the impeachment value was strong and
granted the defendant relief. The better analysis would have assessed the impact of
telling the jury that the witness testified falsely under oath against the defendant. The
impact on her credibility would exceed that of the mere impeachment value of the
recantation.
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Prosecution Culpability and Materiality

In assessing materiality, the court should consider the prosecution's
level of culpability in the use of the false testimony. A finding of bad
faith on the part of the prosecution should increase the likelihood of a
finding of materiality. Similarly, if the prosecutor invoked the false
testimony to persuade the jury to convict, it is more likely that the
testimony is material.
The prosecutor's awareness of the falsity increases the likelihood
that the falsity was material. 261 The Supreme Court recognized the
significance of bad faith in Arizona v Youngblood.262 Defining the
standard to apply in cases where evidence has been lost or destroyed, the
Court held that a requirement that the defendant show bad faith would
single out the cases in which the evidence was more likely to have
26 4
the Second Circuit
favored the defense.263 In Drake v. Portuondo,
The court
applied similar reasoning to a false testimony case.
265
materiality.
as
evidence
of
commented on the prosecutor's conduct
261. See Talamante v. Romero, 620 F.2d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 1980) (noting that
prosecutor's bad faith may affect materiality determination when defendant raised nondisclosure claim); United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[A]
finding of intentional nondisclosure would carry with it a strong presumption that the
prosecutor and members of his staff had perjured themselves."); United States v.
Esposito, 523 F.2d 242, 248-49 (7th Cir. 1975) ( "[A] court should be less inclined to
hold unproduced evidence immaterial or to hold the non-production of admittedly
material evidence harmless error if the prosecutor's failure to reveal the evidence was not
in good faith."). See also United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 146-47 (2d Cir. 1968)
(recognizing that the prosecutor's awareness in non-disclosure cases makes a finding of
materiality more likely, describing as the easy cases those in which the prosecutor
deliberately suppresses favorable evidence, stating that the evidence in such cases is
"almost by definition . . . highly material"); Gershman, Mental Culpability and
Prosecutorial Misconduct, supra note 78, at 160 (suggesting that prosecutorial
misconduct may evidence weakness in government's case); Reiss, supra note 78, at 1413
(noting role ascribed to prosecutor's culpability in assessing materiality).
262. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
263. The Court explained:
[R]equiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the police both limits
the extent of the police's obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds
and confines it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly
require it, i.e., those cases in which the police themselves by their conduct
indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant.
Id. at 58.
264. Drake v. Portuondo, 553 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2009).
265. The court explained:
The prosecutor virtually conceded the materiality of Walter's testimony in
acknowledging that he called Walter to compensate for problems revealed with
his theory of the case after it turned out that there was no evidence of semen in
Smith's rectal cavity. Walter's testimony filled the gap in the prosecution's
theory of intent with a sensationalistic and pseudo-scientific explanation of
motive.
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Correspondingly, the way in which the prosecutor uses the false
testimony may also affect the assessment of materiality. 26 6 The
prosecution gives the falsity a larger role if the prosecution not only
presents false testimony but also invokes and emphasizes the false
information in closing argument.267 The prosecutor's reliance makes it
more likely that the false testimony will have an impact on the
outcome.268 For example, false testimony that conceals inducements to a
Id. at 245.
In an earlier decision in the same case, the Second Circuit commented:
Drake points to the prosecution's "covert and evasive" behavior as evidence of
its knowing complicity in Walter's perjured testimony. The prosecutor
evidently made no independent inquiry into Walter's background, and relied
entirely on the recommendation of a dentist to vet the prosecution's chief
witness on aberrant psychology. The prosecutor had been advised that a
scheduling constraint would require that the trial conclude no later than a
Tuesday certain; the prosecution nevertheless presented Walter's surprise
testimony on the previous Friday, leaving no more than a weekend for the
defense to investigate Walter's qualifications and the esoteric psychological
condition about which he testified. Although defense counsel protested that
over the weekend he could find no psychologist who had so much as heard of
picquerism, the prosecution opposed a continuance. The prosecution concedes
that Walter's highly prejudicial testimony was intended to bolster what it
thought to be a significant weakness in its case on intent, the sole issue at trial.
Drake v. Portuondo (Drake1), 321 F.3d 338, 346 (2d Cir. 2003).
266. In Drake, the court also noted that the prosecutor turned to the false testimony to
fill a gap in the case against the defendant. Drake, 553 F.3d at 245.
267. See, e.g., People v. Junior, 811 N.E.2d 1267, 1272-73 (Ill. App. 2004) (noting
that prosecutor used the witness's false denial of having received a benefit throughout the
trial to strengthen the prosecution's case). The courts have also recognized that the
prosecutor's false statements to the jury may violate due process. See also United States
v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2009) (condemning prosecution's false
statements in argument); Anne Bowen Poulin, ProsecutorialInconsistency, Estoppel, and
Due Process: Making the Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 1423,
1463-65 (2001) (discussing due process violations based on false arguments by
prosecutors). But see Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 5 (1995) (per curiam), the
Court stated that "[i]f the prosecution's initial denial that polygraph examinations of the
two witnesses existed were an intentional misstatement, we would not hesitate to
condemn that misrepresentation in the strongest terms," but went on to conclude that the
evidence was not material. Id. at 5. It is not clear from the context of the case how the
statement concerning the possible prosecution falsity fit into the analysis. The materiality
discussion focused entirely on the fact that the polygraph evidence would not have played
a role at trial. See Henning, supra note 15, at 764-65 (discussing Wood and concluding
that the materiality of a false statement by a prosecutor would be evaluated under the
"reasonable probability" test, and not treated as false testimony).
268. Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1163-64 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting
prosecution's use of false testimony); Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284, 295 (2d Cir. 2002)
(prosecutor's argument based on false testimony "sharpened the prejudice"); United
States v. Seijo, 514 F.2d 1357, 132-63 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that after witness falsely
testified he had no criminal record, prosecution's closing argument emphasized the
witness' lack of record); Junior, 811 N.E.2d at 1273 (finding that false testimony was
material where prosecution used it throughout trial). In Jenkins, the Court also
recognized "the heightened opportunity for prejudice where the prosecutor, by action or
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witness may have a significant impact on the jury's assessment of the
witness's credibility, and that will be enhanced if the prosecutor
emphasizes the lack of inducements. 26 9 The courts should be alert for
prosecution bad faith and prosecution reliance on false testimony as they
assess materiality.
D.

Defense Awareness and the Obligation ofDue Diligence

Defense awareness of the falsity should not necessarily defeat a due
process claim. If the defense was unable to air the issue for the jury
despite awareness of the falsity, the defendant's right to due process has
been violated. 2 70 Nevertheless, courts may be reluctant to find a due
process violation if the defendant was aware of the falsity at trial.271
In considering the impact of defense awareness on due process
analysis, courts should distinguish between non-disclosure and false
testimony cases. Defense knowledge necessarily plays a larger role in
false testimony cases than in failure to disclose cases.272 A claim based
on the prosecution's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence will be
defeated by proof that the defense knew or should have known of the
information. That awareness gives the defense the opportunity to
inaction, is complicit in the untruthful testimony." Jenkins, 294 F.3d at 295; see also
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 295 (examining prosecution's reliance on the witness'
account in closing and noting that the prosecutor did not argue her testimony at the
capital sentencing hearing).
269. See Cassidy, supra note 103, at 1161-64 (discussing the significance of
inducements to the assessment of credibility).
270. Of course, if the alleged falsity is fully revealed to the jury at trial, the
defendant's rights have not been violated. See, e.g., Tompkins v. Moore, 193 F.3d 1327,
1340-42 (11th Cir. 1999) (recounting trial testimony that explored of unavailability of
pre-death dental records from victim, demonstrating inaccuracy of expert's testimony that
he had compared dental records to corpse); United States v. Vaziri, 164 F.3d 556, 562-64
(10th Cir. 1999) (concluding that alleged falsity was disclosed to the jury).
271. See United States v. O'Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 894-95 (5th Cir. 1997)
(commenting that courts are "reluctant" to find a due process violation of the defense has
the information that establishes the falsity but elects not to use it).
272. See United States v. Iverson, 648 F.2d 737, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (summarizing
the law of defense knowledge of false testimony in failure to disclose cases). In Iverson,
the court gave the following account of the role of defense knowledge of the falsity:
The early decisions dealing with the prosecutor's responsibility to disclose
exculpatory information generally proceeded on the assumption that defense
counsel had no knowledge of the critical information. Since then, the doctrine
has been expanded to include situations in which the defense counsel, although
possibly aware of the relevant information, was unable, as a practical matter, to
use it to cast doubt upon contrary evidence proffered by the government or its
witnesses. On the other hand, other recent decisions have indicated that no
violation of due process results from prosecutorial nondisclosure if defense
counsel both knows of the information and is able to make use of it but still
chooses, for tactical reasons, not to do so.
Id.
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develop the exculpatory information at trial, supporting the conclusion
that the defense was therefore not harmed by the prosecution's nondisclosure.2 73 In contrast, uncorrected false testimony may violate the
defendant's constitutional rights even if the defense was aware that the
testimony was false. The government has an obligation not to permit
274
Mere
corruption of the process by presenting false testimony.
awareness of the falsity will not necessarily equip the defense to protect
against the corruption of the trial.275 Despite awareness of the falsity, the
defense may be frustrated in the effort to use the information and reveal
273. See Wilson v. Beard, 589 F.3d 651, 663 (3d Cir. 2009) (acknowledging that
Brady does not require the prosecution to disclose information that the defense knows,
should know, or could discover with reasonable diligence but rejecting the state's
argument that there was no Brady violation because defense could have discovered the
witness's criminal record); United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2005);
United States v. Vallejo, 297 F.3d 1154, 1164 (lth Cir. 2002) (including among the
requirements for a Brady violation that "the defendant does not possess the evidence and
could not obtain the evidence with any reasonable diligence" and rejecting defendant's
Brady claim because the defense could have obtained the questioned evidence through
due diligence); Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 601 (6th Cir. 2000) ("there is no Brady
violation if the defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him
to take advantage of the information in question, or if the information was available to
him from another source"); United States v. Pandozzi, 878 F.2d 1526, 1529-32 (1st Cir.
1989) (rejecting Brady claim based on information that defense could have discovered
through due diligence); United States v. McMahon, 715 F.2d 498, 501-02 (11th Cir.
1983) (rejecting defendant's claim under Brady in part because the defense could have
obtained the withheld documents by exercising reasonable diligence); United States v.
LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 618 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that evidence is not suppressed for
Brady purposes if the defendant knew or should have known of "essential facts
permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence"). The defense is not
obligated to disregard prosecution representations that all favorable information has been
provided. But see Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 695-97 (2004) (rejecting state's
argument that defendant was on notice that favorable information existed despite
reassurance from prosecution that all Brady material was disclosed). In Banks, the Court
rejected as untenable a system in which the prosecution can mislead the defense, while
placing on the defense the burden of discovering the suppressed evidence so long as the
defense has any reason to suspect prosecutorial misconduct. Id. A due diligence
requirement is also imposed on the defendant when the defendant seeks collateral review
or moves for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. See United States v.
Helmsley, 985 F.2d 1202, 1206 (2d Cir. 1993).
274. See Belmontes v. Woodford, 350 F.3d 861, 881 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting
argument that defense awareness defeated false testimony claim, recognizing independent
duty of prosecution to "protect the system against false testimony") (citation omitted).
275. See United States v. Mason, 293 F.3d 826, 829-30 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that
defense access to plea agreement did not relieve prosecutor of obligation to correct
witness's false testimony that he had received no promises in exchange for his
testimony); DeMarco v. United States, 928 F.2d 1074 (11th Cir. 1991) (granting relief
even though defense knew of deal with witness where witness denied deal and
prosecution did not correct the false testimony). Indeed, if the defense challenges the
testimony at trial and the prosecutor fails to take steps to verify its accuracy and thereby
discover its falsity, the case should be treated as one in which the prosecutor should have
known the testimony was false.
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the falsity to the jury.276 Similarly, even if the defendant highlights the
falsity, the prosecution may undermine that effort by fostering the false
impression through misleading questions or closing argument that
exploits the falsity. 27 7 Doing so may violate due process despite defense
knowledge of the falsity.
Of course, if the defense is aware of the falsity, the defense must
exert appropriate efforts to demonstrate that the testimony is false. 27 8 But
the defense obligation is limited by the realities of the case. The Second
Circuit addressed this due diligence requirement in Shih Wei Su v.
276. See, e.g., United States. v. LaPage, 231 F.3d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing
defendant's ineffectual effort to demonstrate that testimony was false). A similar result
was reached on confrontation grounds in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). In
Davis, the trial court acceded to the prosecution's request to bar cross-examination of a
key witness concerning his juvenile offenses and adjudication. Id. at 310-11. As a result,
the defense was precluded from demonstrating the witness's bias even though the defense
possessed all the relevant information. Id. at 312-15. The Court noted that the witness
fostered a false impression and held that the restriction on cross violated the defendant's
right to confront the witness. Id. at 319-20.
277. See Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284, 294-95 (2d Cir. 2002) (detailing prosecutor's
misleading questions and argument); United States v. O'Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 894-95
(5th Cir. 1997); DeMarco v. United States, 928 F.2d 1074, 1077 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting
that prosecution relied on the false testimony in closing argument); United States v.
Barham, 595 F.2d 231 241 (5th Cir. 1979) (testimony conveyed misleading impression
concerning benefits witnesses had received for testifying); Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d
1192, 1195 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Even where defense counsel is aware of the falsity, there
may be a deprivation of due process if the prosecutor reinforces the deception by
capitalizing on it in closing argument, or by posing misleading questions to the
witnesses") (citation omitted). In O'Keefe, the court described the situations in which a
due process violation could occur despite the defendant's possession of evidence
demonstrating the falsity of the testimony:
[E]ven when the defense is aware of the falsity of the testimony, a deprivation
of due process may result when the information has been provided to the
defense but the government reinforces the falsehood by capitalizing on it in its
closing argument, or the defense is unable to utilize the information, or when
the government thereafter asks misleading questions.
O'Keefe, 128 F.3d at 894-95 (citations omitted).
278. See, e.g., Robinson v. Arvonio, 27 F.3d 877, 886 (3d Cir. 1994):
[W]hen it became clear that the prosecutor had not corrected the perjured
testimony, the defense attorney could have alerted the judge and sought a
remedy that would have eliminated any possibility of prejudice to his client,
such as a stipulation or an instruction on the details of the agreement. Instead,
the defense attorney sought to counter the misleading impression through crossexamination and closing argument. Although we agree with Robinson that his
attorney did not waive the error by failing to call it to the attention of the court,
an error which the defense attorney could have corrected at trial is not likely "to
infect the integrity of the proceeding. . .
Id. at 886 (citation omitted).
See also United States ex rel. Regina v. LaVallee, 504 F.2d 580, 583 (2d Cir. 1974)
(stating that where defense is aware that there may have been a promise but the witness
denies it, the defense has an obligation to call available witnesses to prove the existence
of the promise).
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Filion,27 9 holding that the ability of the defense to uncover the falsity did
not defeat the defendant's claim. In Shih Wei Su, the prosecutor falsely
represented there was no agreement with one of the prosecution's
witnesses.280 As a result, the defense elected not to cross-examine the
witness about a possible plea agreement. The court held that the defense
had satisfied its obligation of due diligence. 2 8 1 The court refused to
require the defense to assume the prosecutor had lied, noting that it
would have "involved enormous tactical danger." 2 82 The defense is not
required to impugn the prosecutor's credibility in front of the jury.283
Similarly, in United States v. Sanfilippo,2 84 the prosecution failed to
correct the witness' false testimony denying aspects of his agreement
with the government. The Fifth Circuit rejected the government's
argument that the defendant should have taken additional steps to
disclose the falsity. 2 85 Even though the defense was aware of the terms
of the agreement and knew that the testimony was false, the prosecution
had violated the defendant's right to due process. 28 6 The burden to
correct false testimony from prosecution witnesses lies on the
government, not on the defendant.
IV. CONVICTIONS BASED ON FALSE TESTIMONY WITHOUT
GOVERNMENT CULPABILITY

Approaches are more varied and relief harder to obtain when a
defendant demonstrates that false testimony was presented at trial but
cannot establish prosecutorial culpability. Although one may argue that
allowing a conviction to stand even though it rests on false testimony
violates the constitution, most courts do not accept that argument. If the
prosecutor acquires exculpatory evidence after conviction, Brady does
279. Shih Wei Su v. Filion, 335 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2003).
280. Id. at 123.
281. Id. at 128.
282. In Shih Wei Su, the court further explained:
It follows that when a prosecutor says that there was no deal and later elicits
testimony from a witness denying the existence of a deal, it would be an
unreasonable application of federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,
to fault the defendant for not proceeding in his cross-examination on the
assumption that the prosecutor is a liar.
Id. at 128.
283. See also Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284, 287-89 (2d Cir. 2002) (concluding that
defense had exercised adequate diligence where prosecutor artfully elicited misleading
testimony); United States v. Helmsley, 985 F.2d 1202, 1208 (2d Cir. 1993).
284. United States v. Sanfilippo, 564 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1977).
285. Id. at 178-79.
286. See also DeMarco v. United States, 928 F.2d 1074 (11th Cir. 1991) (reaching
similar result on similar facts). In Sanfilippo, the prosecutor compounded the problem by
invoking the false testimony when arguing to the jury that the witness was credible. 564
F.2d at 178.
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not impose an obligation to disclose that information. 2 87
Correspondingly, prosecutors do not feel obliged to address the impact of
perjury discovered after the fact. 2 88
The Court has not established the approach to be taken when the
post-conviction discovery reveals that the prosecution presented false
testimony to the jury and the defendant cannot satisfy the knowledge
requirement.289 In false testimony cases, the courts' approach should not
be as deferential as in other newly discovered evidence cases. The
287. in District Attorney's Office for Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct.
2308, 2320 (2009), the Court held that a convicted defendant does not have a due process
right of access to evidence to test it for DNA. The Court explained:
A criminal defendant proved guilty after a fair trial does not have the same
liberty interests as a free man. At trial, the defendant is presumed innocent and
may demand that the government prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. But
"[olnce a defendant has been afforded a fair trial and convicted of the offense
for which he was charged, the presumption of innocence disappears."
Id. at 2320 (citation omitted).
In cases where the prosecution becomes aware of the perjury, the recent amendment
to Rule 3.8 may come into play. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.8Special Responsibilities of A Prosecutor, was amended in 2008 and now provides:
(g) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a
reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of
which the defendant was convicted, the prosecutor shall:
(1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority,
and
(2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor's jurisdiction,
(i) promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court
authorizes delay, and
(ii) undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to
cause an investigation, to determine whether the defendant was
convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit.
(h) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing
that a defendant in the prosecutor's jurisdiction was convicted of an offense
that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the
conviction.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2008).
These provisions have not yet been widely adopted. See also Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 427 n.25 (1976) (discussing prosecutor's ethical obligation relating to later
discovery of favorable evidence).
288. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 991 S.W.2d 651, 656 (Ky. 1999); Jones
v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1938). In Spaulding, even after prosecuting its
witness for committing perjury when he testified that the defendant had swung his knife
at the victim the state opposed the defendant's request for relief. 991 S.W.2d at 656. In
Jones, the defendant was facing execution and even though the State Attorney General
believed that the defendant had been convicted on perjured testimony, no state or federal
court up to the Sixth Circuit would grant relief. 97 F.2d at 335.
289. See Evenstad v. Carlson, 470 F.3d 777, 783 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that the
Court has not determined whether such presentation of false testimony violates due
process and that there is a circuit split as to the standard to be applied); see also J. Gabriel
Carpenter, Comment, Determining Whether the Unintentional Use of Perjury by the
Prosecution Warrants a New Trial in Evenstad v. Carlson: The Probability Test or the
Possibility Test?, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 389, 393 (2007).
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presentation of false testimony necessarily corrupts the truth-finding
process to some degree and undermines the claim that the trial was fair.
As a result, the courts should strengthen protection from the unknowing
use of false testimony in two ways. First, the courts should revisit the
constitutional consequences of the unknowing use of false testimony,
recognizing that its corrupting power may violate due process. Second,
even if they do not view it as a constitutional violation, courts should
apply a more lenient standard when a defendant moves for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence that establishes the use of false
testimony at trial.
A.

ConstitutionalViolation?

An argument can be made that the courts should extend due process
protection to false testimony even when the prosecutor did not have the
requisite knowledge at the time the witness testified. 2 90 The corrupting
impact of the false testimony is just as great when it is unknown to the
prosecutor. 29 1 If, as the Court has consistently stated, due process
protects against unfairness in the proceeding, not merely against
prosecutorial wrongdoing, prosecution knowledge should not be required
to establish a due process violation. 29 2 Analysis should focus only on
290. The Supreme Court has not addressed this question. See Evenstad, 470 F.3d at
783; see also Drake v. Portuondo (Drake 1), 321 F.3d 338, 346 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003)
(concluding that AEDPA did not permit granting of habeas relief in the absence of
prosecutorial knowledge of perjury because that argument was not supported by clearly
established Supreme Court precedent); Murray, supra note 102, at 107 (arguing that
unknowing use of perjury to obtain conviction should be held to violate due process).
291. See Reiss, supra note 78, at 1410; Murray, supra note 102, at 107. As Professor
Reiss pointed out in his comprehensive discussion of the role of prosecutorial intent in
establishing constitutional violations: "The effect ... of perjured testimony on the 'truth
seeking function of the trial process' is the same whether or not the prosecutor knows of
the perjury. The prosecutor's knowledge does not change what the jury hears." Reiss,
supra note 78, at 1410. Professor Reiss also argues that "[t]he very idea of procedural
safeguards is to erect mechanisms to ensure just adjudication against improper state
maneuvers, whatever the motivation behind them." Id at 1436.
292. Reiss, supra note 78, at 1407-08 (pointing out the illogic of varying materiality
standard depending on prosecutor's mental state). Professor Reiss explained:
It is clear, then, that under the Agurs-Bagley scheme a prosecutor's mental state
is not, as the Court has insisted, wholly irrelevant to determining when the
nondisclosure of evidence favorable to the defense amounts to constitutional
error. Were the constitutional concern truly limited to 'the misconduct's effect
on the trial,' then the same standard of materiality would be applicable to all
nondisclosures. If some types of prosecutorial suppression are more likely than
others to affect a trial, then such nondisclosures are more apt to meet the
requisite standard of materiality and will more frequently result in a
constitutional violation. There is no need to evaluate their effect under a
different standard of materiality.
Id. at 1407-08 (footnote omitted).
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whether the false testimony rendered the trial and resulting conviction
unfair.293
This argument has not gained traction. Most courts decline to hold
that the use of false testimony violates the defendant's right to due
process in the absence of government knowledge. 29 4 Some have argued
that a knowledge requirement is essential to differentiate false testimony
cases from other newly discovered evidence cases.295 For example, in
The distinctions the Court has drawn in the Brady area reflect differences in the
prosecutor's culpability with respect to different types of suppression.
293. See Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335, 338 (6th Cir. 1938) (granting relief where
the Commonwealth conceded perjury but was taking no steps to set aside conviction and
stating that the defendant "is not to be sacrificed upon the alter of a formal legalism too
literally applied. . . ."); Bibas, supra note 80, at 151-54 (arguing that relief in Brady cases
should not turn on wrongfulness of prosecutor's behavior); Carlson, supra note 77, at
1183-87 (suggesting that defendants should be able to overturn convictions based on false
testimony regardless of governmental knowledge and discussing cases).
294. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1287 n.3 (11th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting defendant's request for due process based relief due to false testimony where
defendant had not shown that prosecution knew or should have known the testimony was
false); United States v. Tierney, 947 F.2d 854, 860-61 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that a
lower standard applies only if the government is at least negligent); Shore v. Warden, 942
F.2d 1117, 1122 (7th Cir. 1991); Sanders v. Sullivan, 863 F.2d 218, 222-24 (2d Cir.
1988) (noting that proof of false testimony does not normally establish a due process
violation and summarizing authority).
295. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 15, at 757-59. Professor Henning addressed the
question of prosecutorial knowledge as an element of a false testimony claim:
Due process must entail something greater than the standard for a new trial, i.e.,
Reliance on the
more than just the existence of perjured testimony.
prosecutor's knowledge of the perjury provides the additional element that
raises questions regarding the fundamental fairness of the proceeding beyond
just the probative value of the newly discovered evidence.
Id. at 759 (emphasis added).
Some courts refuse to extend constitutional protection to these cases because they
conclude that there is no state action when the false testimony is entered without
government culpability. See, e.g., Burks v. Egeler, 512 F.2d 221, 224-25 (6th Cir. 1975);
see also Sanders v. Sullivan, 863 F.2d 218, 224 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing authority);
Murray, supra note 102, at 103 (discussing prosecution knowledge as necessary for state
action). The better view is that prosecution culpability is not necessary for state action.
In Cuyler v. Sullivan, for example, the Court rejected the state's argument that a conflict
of interest on the part of privately retained counsel did not entail state action and
therefore could not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. at 343-45. The Court held that the criminal trial itself satisfied the state action
requirement. Id. at 343-45. In Sanders, the Second Circuit considered and rejected the
argument that a conviction based on false testimony without government knowledge did
not violate the constitution. Sanders, 863 F.2d at 224. The court recognized that the
refusal to intervene to cure a conviction based on false testimony was sufficient state
action to represent a violation of the right to due process. Id. at 224. See also Kentucky
v. Spaulding, 991 S.W.2d 651, 656-57 (Ky. 1999) (holding that the use of perjured
testimony against the defendant involved state action and could constitute a due process
violation even if the prosecution neither knew nor should have known the testimony was
false). But see Schaff v. Snyder, 190 F.3d 513, 530 (9th Cir. 1999) (declining to adopt
the court's position in Sanders).
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Agurs, the Court explained that a different standard is required because
otherwise "there would be no special significance to the prosecutor's
obligation to serve the cause of justice."296 This reasoning is convoluted:
the issue is not the prosecution's failure to adhere to a high standard, but
the fairness of the process to the defendant.
The better view is expressed in decisions recognizing the
unknowing use of false testimony as the basis for constitutionally
mandated relief.29 The government should not be permitted to allow a
conviction based on false testimony to stand. In Sanders v. Sullivan, a
key witness recanted after he met defendant in prison and in his
recantation placed blame for the homicide on someone who was now
deceased. The Second Circuit asserted that "[i]t is simply intolerable ...
that under no circumstance will due process be violated if a state allows
an innocent person to remain incarcerated on the basis of lies." 298 The
court concluded that, if the trial court found the recantation credible, due
process called for relief.299
Courts recognizing that unknowing use of false testimony
represents a constitutional violation impose a higher burden on the

296. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111(1976).
297. See Hall v. Director of Corrections, 343 F.3d 976, 981-84 (9th Cir. 2003). In
Hall, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder based in part on notes produced
by a jailhouse informant in exchange for a deal. Id at 978. After conviction the
informant testified that he had falsified the evidence. Id. at 980.Although the courts were
skeptical of the informant's testimony, it was corroborated by expert handwriting
analysis. Id. at 982. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the letters were false. Even
though the prosecution had not known of the falsity at trial, the court granted the
defendant's petition for habeas corpus, concluding that the falsity was material and that
due process did not permit the prosecution to allow the conviction to stand given its postconviction knowledge that the evidence was fabricated. Id. at 981-85; see also Ex parte
Carmona, 185 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (holding that revocation of probation
based on perjured testimony apparently not known to the prosecution violated due
process); Murray, supra note 102, at 107 (arguing that unknowing use of perjury to
obtain conviction should be held to violate due process). Cf Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S.
277, 290-91 (1956) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (arguing that governmental knowledge was
not essential to due process claim, because post-conviction investigation had revealed
that the testimony of the only witnesses against petitioner was false and that the
conviction was therefore not supported by any competent evidence); Hysler v. Florida,
315 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1942) (Black, J. dissenting) (questioning the limitation of due
process protection to cases in which prosecution knew of falsity at trial).
298. Sanders, 863 F.2d at 224.
299. Id. at 222-24 ("[I]t is indeed another matter when a credible recantation of the
testimony in question would most likely change the outcome of the trial and a state leaves
the conviction in place."). In Sanders, the court recognized that the weight of authority
was against the defendant. Id. at 222 (summarizing authority). The vitality of Sanders as
a protection against erroneous state conviction is not clear under the AEDPA. See Ortega
v. Duncan, 333 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying Sanders to state conviction under
AEDPA); Smith v. Herbert, 275 F. Supp. 2d 361, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (concluding that
Sanders cannot be applied to a petition under the AEDPA).
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defendant than the burden in cases of knowing use of false testimony.3 00
In Sanders, the Second Circuit held that in cases involving false
testimony not known to the prosecution, the defendant was entitled to a
new trial only if the new evidence would probably result in a more
favorable outcome for the defendant. The court emphasized that only
extraordinary instances would violate due process, those in which the
court possesses a "firm belief that but for the perjured testimony, the
defendant would most likely not have been convicted." 3 01 Adopting this
approach would appropriately protect again convictions based on lies.
300. See, e.g., Spaulding, 991 S.W.2d at 656-57. In Spaulding, the court explained
the burden on the defendant seeking to establish such a violation: not only does the
defendant have to prove that specific testimony was perjured but the defendant must
show "both that a reasonable certainty exists as to the falsity of the testimony and that the
conviction probably would not have resulted had the truth been known before he can be
entitled to such relief." Id. at 657. But see Ex parte Chabot, 300 S.W. 3d 768, 771 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009) (concluding that the same standard should apply to unknowing use of
perjured testimony as to knowing use).
301. Sanders, 863 F.2d at 226; see also United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 45657 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying the Sanders standard of review). In Wallach, the court
explained: "Where the government was unaware of a witness's perjury, however, a new
trial is warranted only if the testimony was material and 'the court [is left] with a firm
belief that but for the perjured testimony, the defendant would most likely not have been
convicted."' Wallach, 935 F.2d at 456 (citations omitted). See also Ortega v. Duncan,
333 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that due process is violated by the presentation
of false testimony by a government witness without the prosecution's knowledge only
when "the court [is left] with a firm belief that but for the perjured testimony, the
defendant would most likely not have been convicted" (citations omitted); United States
v. Gallego, 191 F.3d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the standard for a new trial
based on false testimony in the absence of culpability required the defendants to establish
"that they likely would have been acquitted in the absence of the perjured testimony or
had that perjury been exposed at trial").
In some cases, the defendant may be able to establish that defense counsel's failure
to uncover the falsity constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, entitling defendant to
relief on that ground. For example, in Thomas v. Kuhlman, falsity pervaded a trial
without the prosecutor's knowledge but would have been discovered had counsel
performed adequately. Thomas v. Kuhlman, 255 F. Supp. 2d 99 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). In
Thomas, the defendant was convicted of murdering his ex-girlfriend. A central piece of
the prosecution's case was the testimony of a witness testifying in exchange for a
reduction in charges that allowed her to avoid a possible 25-year sentence. Id at 102.
Her testimony placed the defendant on the fire escape outside the victim's apartment at
about the time of the homicide. Unfortunately, it was physically impossible for the
witness to have seen that fire escape from her vantage point. Id at 104. Although the
witness' testimony was false, neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel had visited the
scene, so at trial neither recognized the falsity. Id. at 112. Although the court recognized
that the prosecutor possibly should have known the testimony was false, it concluded that
relief should not be granted on that basis. Id. at 113. Of course, to obtain relief on this
ground the defendant cannot merely establish a reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony affected the verdict but must meet the higher standard, showing that counsel's
failure to discover the falsity was incompetent and that there is a reasonable probability
that counsel's deficiency had an effect on the verdict. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984) (defining requirements for relief based on incompetence of counsel).
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Non-ConstitutionalNew Trial Standard

The defendant's recourse, lacking the constitutional argument, is to
move for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 3 02 That
avenue presents specific impediments.30 3 First, the defendant has a
limited time in which to file the motion. Second, the rule specifically
precludes the new trial if the defense could have discovered the evidence
through the exercise of due diligence. 3 04 Finally, the rule demands that
the defendant meet a higher standard than the materiality standard in
false testimony cases. One question raised by a new trial motion based
on evidence of false testimony is whether the standard should be easier to
satisfy when the new evidence reveals false testimony or perjury in the
original trial.30 s
Even if the unknowing use of false testimony does not violate due
process, the courts should draw a distinction between cases where a
defendant proves that a witness testified falsely at trial and other newly
discovered evidence cases.306 A central challenge is achieving the
appropriate balance between administrative interests such as the finality
of convictions and the defendant's interest in a fair proceeding. 30 7 The
courts should more readily grant the defendant a new trial when newly
discovered evidence demonstrates that trial testimony was false. Proof
of false testimony establishes that the trial process was corrupted to some
degree.30 8 In contrast, a case where the newly discovered evidence does
not uncover false testimony may not entail a corruption of the trial
process; the newly discovered evidence may call the accuracy of the
conviction into question but does not necessarily signal unfairness of the
process itself.
302. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. Rule 33(a) provides: "Upon the defendant's
motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice
so requires. If the case was tried without a jury, the court may take additional testimony
and enter a new judgment." Id.
303. See generally Medwed, supra note 7, at 658-59 (discussing procedural barriers
to new trial); Henning, supra note 15, at 759.
304. United States v. Ogle, 425 F.3d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussing assessment
of new trial motion under the rule).
305. See Daniel Wolf, I Cannot Tell a Lie: The Standardfor New Trial in False
Testimony Cases, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1925, 1945-47 (1985) (arguing that standard should
be more protective).
306. See generally id. at 1945-47 (suggesting four reasons for treating false testimony
cases differently: threat to the defendant's right to a fair trial, threat to the process,
government responsibility, and ability to gauge accurately the impact of the false
testimony on the trial).
307. Id. at 1947 (commenting that approaches to new trial requests based on false
testimony do not strike the proper balance).
308. Id. at 1946 (suggesting that "[w]hen false testimony is introduced, it is likely that
something suspicious(and unfair) is going on at trial").
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The concern with corruption of the process represented by false
testimony at the initial trial has led some courts to adopt a protective test.
The test most favorable to the defendant was established in Larrison v.
United States and adopted by a number of other courts. 30 9 Under the
Larrison test, the court must assess the possibility that the false
testimony affected the outcome but the defendant needs only to
demonstrate that the jury might have reached a more favorable verdict in
the absence of the falsity.3 10 Concerns with the finality of convictions
and the seemingly low hurdle defined by Larrison have persuaded many
courts to reject the test out of the fear that it would lead too often to
reversal. 3 11 The prevailing test instead treats post-conviction proof of
309. Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir.1928); see also United
States v. Wilson, 624 F.3d 640, 663-64 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating that the "might" test
applies in cases of recantation); United States v. Lofton, 233 F.3d 313, 318 (4th Cir.
2000) (stating that "might" test applies to new trial requests based on the discovery that a
prosecution witness testified falsely at trial); United States v. Willis, 257 F.3d 636, 643
(6th Cir. 2001) (holding that standard in recantation cases is whether jury might have
reached a different result without the false testimony); United States v. Massac, 867 F.2d
174, 178-79 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying the Larrison test without expressly adopting it).
See generally Medwed, supra note 7, at 668-69 (discussing the test).
310. Under Larrison, the defendant is entitled to a new trial if:
(a) The court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a material
witness is false.
(b) That without [the testimony,] the jury might have reached a different
conclusion.
(c) That the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false
testimony was given, and was unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity
until after the trial.
Larrison, 24 F.2d at 87-88.
See United States v. Mazzanti, 925 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (7th Cir. 1991) (addressing
variations in test and comparing test with other approaches); Carpenter, supra note 289,
at 391-92 (discussing the test).
It is worth noting that in Larrison, the Seventh Circuit was not persuaded that the
recantation on which the defendants relied was credible, and therefore denied the request
for a new trial. Larrison, 24 F.2d at 89. The Seventh Circuit overruled Larrison in
United States v. Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2004). See also United States v.
Huddleston, 194 F.3d 214, 219 (1st Cir. 1999) (discussing and criticizingLarrison).
311. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 233 F.3d 592, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating
that standard is the same in all newly discovered evidence cases and asking whether
defendant would probably be acquitted at new trial); United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d
237, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1975). In Stofsky, the Second Circuit declined to adopt the Larrison
test and instead adopted the "time-honored probability standard." Stofsky, 527 F.2d at
246. The court explained its reluctance to apply the more lenient standard:
[Tihe test, if literally applied, should require reversal in cases of perjury with
respect to even minor matters, especially in light of the standard jury
instruction that upon finding that a witness had deliberately proffered false
testimony in part, the jury may disregard his entire testimony. Thus, once it is
shown that a material witness has intentionally lied with respect to any matter,
it is difficult to deny that the jury, had it known of the lie, 'might' have
acquitted.
Id. at 46.
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perjured testimony like other newly discovered evidence and requires the
defendant to satisfy a probability standard, a higher hurdle than
Larrison's "might" test. 3 12 This approach gives too little weight to the
distinct threat posed by false testimony. 3 13
In United States v. Williams,3 14 for example, the D.C. Circuit
addressed and rejected the argument that newly discovered evidence of
falsity should be assessed differently from other newly discovered
The court
evidence, characterizing the difference as "illusory."
explained:
Newly discovered evidence may often tend to prove that the evidence
before the jury was not "true." A third party may confess to the
crime; it may turn out that the main government witness has a string
See also Medwed, supra note 7, at 664-65 (discussing emphasis on finality); Wolf,
supra note 305, at 1930-33 (criticizing standard established in Larrison).
312. See Mitrione, 357 F.3d at 718 (gathering decisions from the federal circuits).
The probability test is sometimes referred to as the Berry test, acknowledging its origin in
Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511 (Ga. 1851). In Berry, considering whether the defendant was
entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the court asked whether the
new evidence "would probably produce a different result" and also asked whether the
new evidence would be" likely to change the verdict which has been rendered." Id. at
513, 528. See generally Medwed, supra note 7, at 667-68 (discussing the Berry test).
313. There are also divergent approaches to the focus of the inquiry. See United States
v. Williams, 233 F.3d 592, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (recognizing difference in approaches);
Carpenter, supra note 289, at 405-06 (discussing approaches). Some courts look forward,
asking whether the new evidence would probably result in a more favorable verdict if the
defendant won a new trial. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 233 F.3d 592, 594-95
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (defining test and concluding that in a new trial, prosecution could avoid
calling witness who committed perjury and obtain conviction using other witnesses);
United States v. Huddleston, 194 F.3d 214, 217-21 (1st Cir. 1999) (discussing and
adopting forward-looking standard and concluding the new trial would result in
conviction); United States v. Provost, 969 F.2d 617, 622 (8th Cir.1992) (applying
forward-looking standard); United States v. Sinclair, 109 F.3d 1527, 1532 (10th
Cir. 1997) (stating forward-looking test). In Williams, the court recognized the difference
between the two approaches to the inquiry. Williams, 233 F.3d at 595. But see United
States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 844-46 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating the rule both as forwardlooking and as backward-looking). Others apply a backward-looking test and require the
defendant to show that the jury would probably have reached a different verdict in the
absence of the perjury. See, e.g., Mitrione, 357 F.3d at 718 (holding that defendant must
show that jury would probably have acquitted had it not heard the perjured testimony, but
concluding that the defendant did not); United States v. Petrillo, 237 F.3d 119, 123-24
(2nd Cir. 2000) (applying a backward-looking test and concluding "new evidence was
unlikely to have altered the jury's verdict. . . ."). A variation on the backward-looking
test is to ask whether the jury would have convicted had the witness' testimony been
exposed as perjury. See, e.g., Ortega v. Duncan, 333 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 2003)
(concluding that had the jury known of the witness' perjury, it would have been unlikely
to convict); see also Wolf, supra note 305, at 1932-33.
314. Williams, 233 F.3d at 595.
315. Id at 595. The court cited the discussion in Daniel Wolf, I Cannot Tell A Lie:
The Standardfor New Trial in False Testimony Cases, supra note 305, at 1945, and
found it unpersuasive.
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of felony convictions; proof positive of the defendant's alibi might
surface. Any one of these items of newly discovered evidence, in
various degrees, throws doubt on the accuracy of the trial evidence
pointing to the defendant's guilt.31 6
The Williams court failed to acknowledge that false testimony cases
necessarily entail an affirmative effort to mislead the jury and that few
pieces of evidence will have as great an impact on a jury as learning that
a witness has knowingly lied. The impact of previously undisclosed
favorable evidence will depend on how the facts were presented at trial
and will not necessarily undermine the credibility of any particular
witness.
Consider for example the post-trial discovery that, unknown to the
prosecution team, a prosecution witness was engaged in criminal activity
at the time of trial. If neither the defense nor the prosecution asked
questions that elicited false answers, the later-discovered evidence
merely offers an additional basis for impeaching the witness.317
However, if the witness was asked related questions at trial and gave a
false denial, the newly discovered evidence has greater significance. The
witness actively corrupted the truth-finding process, misleading the jury.
The witness' credibility is vulnerable to the most pointed attack-proof
that the witness testified falsely under oath to this fact finder.
In cases of false testimony, the courts' approach to new trial
motions should emphasize the fairness of the process over interests in
finality.31 8 It is more destructive of the justice process to have false
testimony presented to the fact finder at trial than simply to have missed
some evidence.319 The test should fall closer to the protective end of the
spectrum: the courts should grant the defendant a new trial if it is
reasonably likely that the false testimony had an impact on the
outcome.32 0
V.

CONCLUSION

Courts must reinvigorate the law to deliver on the promise that the
due process clause protects against convictions based on false testimony.
Despite clear precedent, courts do not enforce this aspect of due process
316. Williams, 233 F.3d at 595.
317. There would be no Brady violation because the prosecution neither knew nor
should have known of the information.
318. See Wolf, supra note 305, at 1934 (criticizing the probability test of giving
insufficient weight to considerations of fairness).
319. But see Carpenter,supra note 289, at 399-400 (pointing out that courts generally
apply the same test regardless of whether the newly discovered evidence reveals perjury).
320. See Wolf, supra note 305, at 1947-49 (advocating for "significant chance" test);
see also Carpenter,supra note 289, at 404-06 (discussing differences among tests).
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protection with clarity and consistency. The protection has been
diminished by decisions that interpose barriers that defendants cannot
surmount. To provide appropriate protection, the requirements a
defendant must meet to receive relief based on the use of false testimony
must be clarified in the following ways. First, the prosecution should be
deemed to have knowledge of the falsity not only if an individual
prosecutor had actual knowledge but also if the prosecution did not meet
its duty to discover that the testimony was false or if knowledge of the
contrary information is possessed by other government actors and
therefore imputed to the prosecution. Second, to support a due process
claim based on false testimony, the falsity need not meet the definition of
perjury; the testimony may be merely misleading. Third, the courts
should apply the more lenient standard of materiality defined for false
testimony cases and should ask how the revelation that the witness had
testified falsely would have influenced the jury in the initial trial.
Finally, the courts should recognize that a defendant may advance a valid
false testimony claim even if the defense knew or should have known
that the testimony was false, unless the falsity was fully aired at the trial.
In addition, the courts should revisit the law that applies when a
defendant discovers that the prosecution unknowingly presented false
testimony. If the falsity was material, the courts should conclude that the
conviction violates due process despite the lack of prosecution
knowledge. Even if the courts do not extend due process protection to
the unknowing use of false testimony, they should grant the defendant a
new trial more readily than with other types of newly discovered
evidence. The corrupting impact of false testimony calls for at least this
level of protection.

